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1Introduction“Let’s stop all this philosophizing and get back to business”1
Philosophy and engineering seem worlds apart. From their remarks, we might infer
that engineers value little the problems philosophers address and the analyses they
pursue. Ontological questions about the nature of existence and the categorial
structure of reality – what one takes as real in the world – seem to be of scant inter-
est. It would appear that engineers don’t need philosophy; they know the differ-
ence between the concrete and the abstract, the particular and the universal – they
work within both of these domains every day, building and theorizing, testing and
modeling in the design and development of new products and systems. Possible
worlds are not fictions but the business they are about. As Theodore Von Karman,
an aerospace engineer and educator, reportedly claimed
Scientists discover the world that exists; engineers create the world that 
never was. 
Epistemological questions about the source and status of engineering knowl-
edge likewise rarely draw their attention.2 Engineers are pragmatic. If their pro-
ductions function in accord with their designs, they consider their knowledge
justified and true. Such knowledge, they will show you, is firmly rooted in the sci-
entific explanation of phenomenon which, while dated according to physicists,
may still provide fertile grounds for innovative extension of their understanding of
how things work or might work better. This complicates my task; for my intention
is to show that philosophy can matter, does matter, to engineers. I want to explore
in what ways it might contribute to doing a better job of designing and, as a teacher
of the craft how it might help us in better preparing our students for life as well as
for professional practice. 
Most professionals would agree that the process of designing itself stands in
need of improvement.3 Many recognize that the days when an engineer could work
alone in his cubical on some specialized bit of the whole, then throw his work over
the wall to the next in line, are over. Some, in attempting to improve engineering
education, are even challenging the traditional lecture format, where faculty, back
to their students, cover the chalk board, unfurling the fundamentals of their spe-
cialty with little regard to the worlds around them. Yet the remedies and changes
2           Chapter  1proposed to renew the profession on both counts fall short. I hope to explain why
this is the case.
I also hope that this exploration, by getting behind the Oz-like curtain draped
out front, will give the general reader a better and truer understanding of engineer-
ing – what resources, knowledge and know-how it requires, what it can not, as well
as can do. My remarks might also prompt some interest on the part of philoso-
phers; perhaps they will see in engineering thought and practice a fertile field for
the cultivation of old themes but in a new light.
Certain philosophers have considered technology a worthy subject for comment
and analysis. Few, however, have considered the design of technology a subject
worth addressing, perhaps because of the inaccessibility and complexity of the
design process or because engineering is deemed so mundane and rule-respecting
that there is nothing worth critique and analysis – a presumption which resonates
with the character of much philosophical exploration when technology is the tar-
get, e.g., explorations of the autonomous character of technique and its “impacts”. 
At the Technical University of Delft, there is a group of philosophers who see
technology otherwise: Funded by the Dutch equivalent of the US National Science
Foundation, they seek to better understand the “dual nature” of technological arti-
facts. 
On the one hand, these are physical objects with a specific physical 
structure (physical properties), the behavior of which is governed by 
the laws of nature. On the other, an essential aspect of any technologi-
cal object is its function.... 
This dual nature of technological objects is reflected in two different 
modes of description, via. a structural and a functional mode. Insofar 
as it is a physical object, a technological object can be described in 
terms of its physical (structural) properties and behavior....free of any 
reference to the function of the object....With regard to its function, a 
technological object is described in an intentional (teleological) way:4
While the distinction is real, the duality ought not to be taken as expressing a
disjunction of the sort reflected in those who talk of “two cultures” or of “impacts
of technology on society”. The issue at hand is not of this sort. Rather the quest is
to explain how participants in product design and development transform interest,
beliefs and intentions into a functioning product. How do the authors of an artifact
or system endow (material) substance with the appropriate form so that it will
function properly, as intended? This, too, is my concern.   
I am not a philosopher: All of my formal education has been in engineering. I
have, however, over the past thirty five years, taken seriously the challenge set by
C.P. Snow and worked to bridge the two cultures. I know something about the his-
tory of science and have taken a keen interest in the social study of science and
technology. Still, philosophy stands a world apart, even from these domains. It is
another scholarly discipline, a whole other world requiring new learning, a new
vocabulary, a new sense of what is a legitimate question – none the less what is an
important question – and what constitutes a coherent, legitimate response. I am
Introduction   3just beginning to learn to speak in this domain. And like a neophyte, I have many
awkward questions. My approach, then, is not to try to construct a formal philo-
sophical treatise, but to draw upon my experiences – as designer, as consultant, as
researcher, as teacher – in setting out and exploring some hopefully fruitful con-
nections.
Most of my professional life has been spent as a faculty member doing research
and teaching within the field of engineering mechanics. One thing that continues to
surprise me each year, is the apparent inability of some of my students, and there
are always some, to see the world – of bridges and buildings, forces and torque –
as I do. At times, they come up with the most bizarre questions when challenged
with certain problems and yet seem unable to accept and digest the explanations I
provide5. They have, what faculty of schools of education responsible for the prep-
aration of science teachers tag “serious misconceptions” – a topic about which
there is an ever-growing body of literature in the scholarly journals in science edu-
cation. The “naive science”, or “common sense science”, or, still more tolerant,
“alternate world views” of youth are all to be rooted out, washed away, to make
room for the way things really work, e.g., the true stories about planetary motion;
equal and opposite internal forces; uniformly accelerated motion, and the like. 
I myself, find this deviant behavior on the part of my students refreshing and
provocative: When so challenged, I want to know where in the world they got this
strange way of seeing things. What do they call upon to justify their misconcep-
tions? If I can reconstruct something of the student’s conceptual scheming – which
he or she might or might not acknowledge as their way of thinking – then I have a
much better chance of success at conversion of the student from error to my way of
seeing.6 
Misconceptions are not necessarily disabling. Common sense ordinarily serves
us well as a basis for thinking, acting and social exchange (until its undoing by sci-
ence). Unquestioned presumptions on the one hand and long dead myth and meta-
phor on the other, are normally harmless. In fact, in ordinary times, they are
enabling.7 Indeed, if misconceptions and common sense were somehow disal-
lowed, we would still be living in a stone age. Popper is right: Progress is the prod-
uct of ill-conceived conjecture and its possible refutation.    
But these are not ordinary times. Advances in technology, particularly in com-
puter, communication and information processing technologies have swept over
and shaken up the world of politics, commerce, business, engineering and even
engineering education. Engineers are both responsible, in part, for the develop-
ment of this technology and are subject to it, must learn to live with it and to put it
to use effectively as much as any other persons. Faculty must learn to teach about
and with it. Practitioners must both cope with it and shape it to their immediate
needs. 
The changes afoot go beyond learning to put these new “tools” to use on the job
for there is an across the board upheaval in the nature and organization of engi-
neering practice and of professional life. Computation tools and methods have
become ever more sophisticated and powerful so the emphasis at work shifts from
calculation and analysis to model making, to world making. Lifting our heads up
4           Chapter  1from the calculator and the drawing board, our field of view enlarges; what were
distant shadows now become features to be reckoned with. Design criteria
broaden. Industrial ecology means that boundaries around the product can no
longer be so impervious to the interests of “outsiders”. “Open software” design
explicitly recognizes the legitimacy of others, down stream to contribute to the
design, calling into question the idea of a “finished product” as well as challenging
traditional norms governing “ownership”. Ethical and safety questions permeate
the design process, seeping through into the foundational structure of scientific
and instrumental analysis. At the same time, engineers are to be multi-disciplinary,
polyvalent; they are to be able to work in teams – and not just teams meeting in the
same room. For, in this day and age, participants in a product’s design and devel-
opment may be distributed around the globe. Design is to be done concurrently
with many voices in harmony. I am not alone in emphasizing the uncertainty and
ambiguity engineers must cope with as a result of this new mix. 
It is at times like these, when our ordinary ways of thinking and doing are
called into question, when philosophy might prove enlightening. For philosophy’s
aim is to clarify, to analyze, to probe and explore alternate ways of seeing, of
speaking, and, ultimately, of remaking the world. These essays are meant as a go at
evaluating certain characteristics of engineering thought and practice with the aim
of bringing to the surface their essentials – the essential, fundamental beliefs of
what may be called an engineering mind set. The hope is that this will help us see
our way clear through these times of change, to rationally address what needs
changing, what’s best left sacred. 
I tried once before to sketch out the fundamentals. In Designing Engineers8 I
noted that the worlds engineers fabricate and work within show hierarchy. Mathe-
matical/scientific theory is higher up; e.g., the concepts and principles of the the-
ory of elasticity are more fundamental than the specialized relationships which
derive from the theory and describe the behavior of particular phenomena – the
stresses within an end-loaded, cantilever beam, the buckling load of a column, the
modes of vibration of a thin, flat plate. I spoke of an engineer’s commitment to
continuity, to conservation principles, to cause then effect, to both concrete partic-
ulars and abstractions; to measurement and quantification, estimation and cer-
tainty. Here I take another stab at this, singling out for reflection certain
characteristics of what I there dared to label an engineer’s “cosmology”. 
Foremost among these is the reductive way of seeing the world, of framing the
task. An instrumental, usually quantitative, assessment of the functioning of a
design or system is, of course, necessary to getting the job done, but it does not
suffice. Consider, for example, the reduction of a design task to clearly demar-
cated, independent subtasks. While the attempt should always be made, I claim
that complete independence of one task from another can not be achieved; negotia-
tion at the “interfaces” of the different subtasks will always be required. If the pos-
sibility, nay probability, of this sort of social exchange goes unacknowledged or
does not even enter one’s field of view, any attempts at improving the design pro-
cess are bound to be discouraging. For it is a mistake to imagine that the tensions
springing from the different proposals of participants in design which precipitate
Introduction   5out at the interfaces can be resolved by instrumental means, e.g., an optimization
algorithm, alone.
Or consider the assumption “all other things being equal” – always made at
some point in an engineer’s seeing and thinking, modeling and predicting. Of
course, one ultimately has to attribute a measure of uniformity to the world and
limit one’s attention to what is taken to be of primary importance to the successful
functioning of one’s plans and productions but where boundaries are drawn, what’s
in, what’s out, depends as much upon the categories one acknowledges to exist as
it does upon the relative significance of factors accommodated so “naturally” from
the instrumental perspective of one’s speciality. For example, if you see social
agents as machines, as ergonomic objects or behaviorist’s boxes, then it matters
little how much further articulation of the machinery is pursued if someone asks
how the product will contribute to a sense of community among the citizenry. Here
is misconception of a different kind, akin to blindness.
Ceteris paribus and reduction are fundamental to engineering thought and prac-
tice. Allied is a more prosaic notion, that of “product”. We envision the boundaries
of a product as sharp and distinct. The artifact is not only detached in a material
sense but taken as neutral and value free. This too is myopic. A product is in some
measure material, made to fulfill some intended function, but is better construed
as, in another sense, ideological as well – a human creation which reaches out
beyond the box it came in to enable and to affect (and infect) our thoughts, our val-
ues, our beliefs as well as our practices. We all might agree that technology has the
dual nature of structure and function, but even this way of speaking is too limiting:
It presumes that “structure” contains the hard science, there for all to see in the
same way, while function is limited to the acknowledged intentions of designers -
and possibly users. 
My aim is to subject these characteristic, fundamental ways of seeing, or not
seeing as the case may be, to critique. In what way are they no longer justified?
What new forms of thinking, new ways of seeing, are required?
As engineering faculty, we claim to teach the fundamentals. Used in this more
ordinary way, the word points to the primary concepts and principles that lie at the
roots of the disciplines, whether mechanics, electronics, thermodynamics, etc.
(Different disciplines, different species of trees, some with very shallow roots, oth-
ers which go all the way to China – from a Western perspective). These underwrite
the engineer’s heuristics and derivation of relationships among variables and
parameters which describe, in what I call object world language, the way a particu-
lar product, artifact, system will hopefully function. So scattered about in the
chapters which follow are equations and simple abstract images. Confronting
these, I encourage the reader not to turn away but to read on, for this essay is not
meant as an engineering textbook. Rather, I hold that to analyze and explain the
status and function of engineering knowledge requires a display and critique of the
texts engineers themselves construct and rely upon as much as it does explaining
the rationale of their productions. 
My concern with texts reflects a shift in scholarship over the past century
within the humanities, arts and social sciences. Philosophy, it is said, has taken a
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an analysis of the facts of the world (including persons) found in the world “out
there” or “inside me” to an analysis of the way we speak about the world. In so
doing, philosophers have discovered that much of the time we don’t know what we
are talking about and have strived to clarify, to show us how what we take as prob-
lematic in the world is, or may be, but a problem with the way we express matters.
More recently, some claim that philosophy has taken a “cognitive turn” or at least
a branching. This appears to mean that the study of language is not enough; we are
to go inside now and analyze the cognitive structures we construct, project, and
express in language as we muddle along. 
From the tone, you might surmise that I do not fully agree with all of this man-
uevering. True, I don’t fully agree but I do embrace the notion that to explain the
world we have to pay close attention to who, in this case engineers, is doing the
explaining – their predilections and presumptions, the traditions they draw upon,
the way they describe the world they live in. It is not enough to study propositions,
facts, abstract and in themselves alone; context matters. Wittgenstein, after turning
away from a rather sterile picture of the world of facts and propositions, recog-
nized that rules and meanings in talk and texts were mixed up with practice, with
context of use. In order to understand how a rule is to be applied, he claimed, one
must study how it is used. Those who study “situated cognition” appear to be say-
ing much the same thing, i.e., the meaning of statements is embedded in practice9. 
Some critics see danger in all this movement away from classical philosophical
concerns. If language, if practice matters and the import of our rules, the games we
engage, the things we say, and the texts we write can only be explained by paying
full attention to context, including the intentions of the author and the culture of
the reader, then the established boundaries among scholarly disciplines tend to dis-
solve, or at least be challenged. A proposition in the abstract, like an isolated fact,
looses its significance. The narrative within which these are embedded need to be
studied. Rhetoric and philosophy are joined.
There is a resonance here with the fact/theory dichotomy in science. Philoso-
phers and historians of science have come to recognize that facts are conditioned
by theory and theory does not stand apart from prevailing, more public and general
ways of seeing and talking about the world. Facts are not just out there in the
world, waiting to be discovered or uncovered. Theory, extant beliefs, the stories
we tell, as well as our instruments for seeing, fix what we see as something impor-
tant – what are significant things, variables, and parameters – as well as how they
interact and relate in the world. Thomas Kuhn went so far to claim that a Coperni-
can lived in a different world than his Aristotelean predecessor. 
Engineers do construct narratives, not very fancy ones perhaps, but subtle in
ways I hope to explain. It is quite common to think that the explanations of engi-
neers are objective, scientific, one-dimensional, lacking in ambiguity, trope or
metaphor. To see that it is otherwise, requires we pay full attention to the way
instrumental reasoning is embedded in text and to allow that the form of argument
and the language used, in short, the rhetoric of engineering is part and parcel of
instrumental explanation. Note: In this I am speaking of the ordinary texts engi-
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the language of their grant applications or stories manufactured for public con-
sumption.   
Another shortsightedness, namely that the past is irrelevant to doing the work
of today, derives from the apparent timeless quality of engineering explanation.
Engineering explanation is like scientific explanation in this respect. A machine, a
new product, a computer program – whatever artifact one has in view – pretends to
work always and everywhere in the same way. The principles upon which it relies
are expressed as they were in the beginning, are now, and ever shall be, forever and
ever. The constitution of machinery needs no new interpretation with changing
times. So history, like rhetoric, is irrelevant to understanding technology – or so it
would seem. 
One can indeed construct an explanation of engineering thought and practice
from this perspective, limiting your field of view to include only those events and
“variables” that have this timeless, instrumental quality. One can, for example,
study the way a new products works, lay out the reasons why it works and how the
integration of its different parts and subsystems is achieved, and claim that this
instrumental explanation describes as well the design process, the way it came to
be. This is a mistake. It fails to acknowledge that designing is a social process of
negotiation, of iteration, of rectifying mis-steps, even misconceptions – a process
rich in ambiguity and uncertainty. 
History is important to understanding the genesis of technology. In attending to
history we get behind, as it were, technology’s so dominate instrumental presence
to explore the give and take of ideas, the mix of material representation and scien-
tific principle, and the field of constraints within which the engineer labors. We
uncover both the dated nature of technique and reveal the conditions for its mak-
ing.   
My attempts to explore and explain the connections and relationship between
philosophy and engineering, through the study of engineering narrative and histor-
ical process, is a way of acknowledging that context matters and must be attended
to if we are to say anything that takes us beyond an instrumental explanation of the
type engineers profess themselves. In these times of change, if we are to claim
some control over the future, we must allow that what needs to change includes
more than the tools, the organization, the methods, the hardware and software, but
more fundamentally, ways of perceiving and reading the world. 
In engineering we see the world through glasses that let through the instrumen-
tal, the calculable, the scientific, alone; the rest of the world is but a haze. My
claim is that we do need to see the world differently. The world we live in, are
remaking now, is a different world. The reductive, instrumental character of engi-
neering thought and practice is what we seek to explain and critique. 
In the essays that follow, we approach our topic, not directly, but through dif-
ferent kinds of activities engineers engage: The first essay, Chapter 2, describes
the languages of design and the negotiations their differences entail. The second
addresses how engineers deal with failure and error. The third explores the ways
they model and idealize the world they remake. The fourth how they teach. 
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1. Remark recorded at a meeting held to evaluate possible design options.
2. A notable exception is the work of Walter Vincenti, another aerospace engi-
neer! Vincenti, W., What Engineers Know and How They Know It, Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press, 1990. Less well known is an excellent article by Vincent Hendricks,
Arne Jakobsen, and Stig Pedersen, “Identification of Matrices - in science and
engineering”, Journal of General Philosophy of Science, 2, 2000.
3. It is an interesting question whether improving the process of design will nec-
essarily improve the quality of the product. This need not be the case, though one
would expect it might be so. The question, however, is hazardous, and this in two
ways: First, what is judged a better process or product will depend upon whom you
ask. Second, the whole argument can easily become circular, especially if judge-
ment is passed after the fact, after the better or worse product goes out the door
and is launched out into the world.
4. The Empirical Turn in the Philosophy of Technology, Kroes, P. & Mejers, A.,
(eds). Elsiver Science, 2000. p. 28. 
5. I conjecture that it was this sort of experience that Wittgenstein had while
teaching middle school students off in the hinterlands of Austria that provoked his
philosophical transformation. Monk, Ray, Ludwig Wittgenstein: the duty of genius
London, Jonathan Cape, 1990.
6. Of interest too is a more general question: How does one, how can one con-
struct a rational explanation for what is apparently irrational explanation?
7. Lakoff, G., and Johnson, M., Metaphors We Live By, Chicago, Univ. Chicago
Press, 1980.
8. Bucciarelli, L.L., Designing Engineers, MIT Press, 1994.
9. I agree, but I am put off a bit by the emphasis upon “practice”. It smacks too
much of un-reflective action, of the exercise of skill alone without thinking. Cer-
tainly a skilled practitioner in action – a carpenter, plumber, surgeon, or pianist,
for example – is ordinarily not doing much thinking; the exception being when the
rhythm of execution is challenged by the unanticipated. That’s the whole point of
being skilled; you don’t stop after each impact of the hammer, each pass of the
torch or knife, to reflect upon what you have just accomplished or where the next
note on the keyboard lies. Engineers are skilled too in different ways; but they do
stop and think, and rethink, and redo, and rethink as they go about designing.
2Designing, like language, is a social process.There is a cartoon familiar to most aerospace engineers which purports to
depict the design of an aeroplane: It shows in some half dozen frames on a single
page, the different visions of the final product which accord with the different
interests of those responsible for its design. The vision of the structural engineer
includes massive I-beams which assure the craft does not fall apart; the vision of
the design participant responsible for powering the craft shows very little structure
other than that required to support the huge twin engines. The aerodynamicist’s
representation is as sleek and slim as one might imagine; there is hardly room for
the pilot. And so it goes; and, indeed, that is akin to the way it goes. For in a nut-
shell, engineering design is a process which engages different individuals, each
with different ways of seeing the object of design but yet individuals who in col-
laboration, one with another, must work together to create, imagine, conjecture,
propose, deduce, analyze, test and develop a new product in accord with certain
requirements and goals. 
Participants in any design project of all but the simplest kind, working in dif-
ferent domains on different features of the system, will have different responsibili-
ties and more often than not, the creations, findings, claims and proposals of one
individual will be at variance with those of another. While they all share a common
goal at some level, at another level their interests will conflict. As a result, negoti-
ation and “trade-offs” are required to bring their efforts into coherence. This, in
turn, makes designing a social process. If we stop here, this not terribly problem-
atic. What complexifies the situation and makes designing a challenge of the high-
est order is that each participant sees the object of design differently. 
In Designing Engineers,1 I provide evidence for this claim: I report on three
design projects, one which consisted of a small group, on the order of ten people,
engaged at a firm in the design and development of a large photovoltaic module. In
the book I describe how participants in design saw the design differently, then ana-
lyze the consequences of my observations and conjecture. 
The team at “Solaray” included a mechanical engineer responsible for the
design of the module frame, the protective layers of backing, the sizing of the
cover glass, and assembly of the product. An electrical engineer was ultimately
responsible for the design of the series/parallel circuitry of the photovoltaic cells,
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including junctions and cabling. 
The responsibility of a materials person from cell production was to character-
ize the performance of the individual cells and explore how statistical variations
from cell to cell would affect the output of the module as a whole. A marketing
person with an engineering background headed up the system’s engineering group.
His primary concern was to see that the prescribed current-voltage characteristics
of a single module would allow for the build-up of systems of aggregates of mod-
ules which could meet the special needs of a wide variety of different customers.
Each of these people had some significant say about the design of the new, large
photovoltaic module.
All, as members of the firm Solaray – a corporate entity whose purpose like
others was production for profit – came together to design a product of quality
which would contribute to their and the firm’s survival. At the same time, they
were in competition one with another, each evidencing a different view of the
object of design and of the relative importance of the critical design parameters
and of how they should be set. 
To the systems engineer, the module was a “black box”; he viewed it as a func-
tioning whole, a unit joined with others in series and parallel to provide the bus
voltage and power level a range of systems might require. The materials person,
concerned with the characterization of the distribution of properties of the photo-
voltaic cells didn’t “see” a module at all; rather, to her, the cells were units in an
electrical circuit whose overall behavior depended upon the degree of “mismatch”
among the current-voltage characteristics of the individual cells.2 The electrical
engineer from the system’s group on the other hand took the cells as identical in
his design of alternative possible series/parallel circuit configurations. He
described the module as a circuit topology of ideal current generators and associ-
ated electrical elements, e.g., diodes, connectors. The mechanical engineer focused
on the module’s structure; the frame and the cover-glass were foremost in mind.
To him, the cells were fragile wafers of glass which needed to be supported, fixed
in a plane and protected from the weather. 
The differences in readings of the photovoltaic module correlate with the dif-
ferent individual’s responsibilities and are rooted in their different educational his-
tories and experiences on the job. Each individual projects out into the design
process her or his own reading of the object. It’s like a theory of vision of antiq-
uity that shows rays emanating from the eye out onto the world, rays which reflect
and return to the seer signaling the presence and nature of the object. Analogously,
different individuals in design emit rays of a different character which are
reflected back differently by the object of design. Each participant sees differently
in accord with the standards of thought and practice within their domain of spe-
cialization. It’s like they live in different worlds. 
We speak occasionally of multiple worlds, e.g., “the world of mathematics” or
“the world of algae”, “the world of Escher”, or “The Wonderful World of
Insects”.3   The world of algae is different from the world of Escher, and insects
have a whole different milieu to contend with. All these creatures live in the same
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at large, out there, differently. We can even claim they live in incommensurable
worlds. So too within engineering, the structural engineer has a certain way of
dealing with, describing, and speaking about the world. He or she draws upon an
infrastructure of standards and regulations, of suppliers and consultants for sup-
port, e.g., a library of standard structural forms and sections. More formally, there
is a mathematical theory which describes at a fundamental level how elastic con-
tinua and structural elements behave when weighted down or flown, vibrated, or
deformed. There are computer programs designed specifically for modeling com-
plex and simple structures of all shapes and sizes. Certain machinery exists for
testing materials and completed structures; instrumentation and sensors have been
developed specifically for his or her use in this regard. structural engineers have
their own professional journals, professional societies, and their own existential
pleasures - I suppose.
The world of the electronics engineer is different. Different infrastructure of
standards and regulations, different off-the-shelf devices to choose from and build
with, different forms of mathematics, different ways of sketching and modeling –
the block diagram figures largely here – and different computer tools for modeling
their systems. Testing instruments and apparatus are different. Time even has a
different quality. Dynamic response predominates. And of course their profes-
sional journals and societies differ from those of other engineering disciplines. 
And so it is, down through the list of all those who have a significant say in a
design process. Each inhabits a world of things particular and employs specialized
modes of representation. A world with its own unique instruments, reference texts,
prototypical bits of hardware, special tools, suppliers’ catalogues, codes, regula-
tions and unwritten rules. There are exemplars, standard models of the way things
work from the disciplinary perspective of the particular world and particular meta-
phors which enlighten and enliven the efforts of inhabitants. There are specialized
computational methods, specialized ways of graphically representing states and
processes. And each participant works with a particular system of units and with
variables of particular dimensions, certain ranges of values perhaps. Dynamic pro-
cesses, if that is their concern, unfold with respect to a particular time scale - for
someone’s world it may be milliseconds, in another’s, hours or days. I say that dif-
ferent participants work within different object worlds.
Engineering Design - Other Perspectives.
Before going further, I want to spend a moment and describe some other views,
some more standard representations, of the engineering design process. I do this
for several reasons: To describe design as a social process does not seem, at first,
to take us very far if our intent is to come up with prescriptions for improving the
process. Second, these other ways of viewing design process are taken seriously by
those who seek to improve the process and are even put to use in practice. I ought
to acknowledge that fact. Third, and of primary interest, keeping in mind our
desire to connect up philosophy with engineering, comparing the view of design as
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of which will become clear with my examples - prompts questions about the ways
of thinking and doing in engineering which, if we are to address them seriously,
requires a philosophical sensitivity. My purpose, then, is not so much to compare
these methods in terms of their efficacy for guiding design practice but rather to
explore how they represent different ways of thinking about the design process. 
Figure 2.1, from Dixon4 shows a traditional picture of the design process as it is
presented and described in the engineering textbook. It shows, on the left, some
stages in the design process beginning with “Goal recognition”, “Task specifica-
tion”, and ending with “Distribution, Sales, and servicing”.   The box labeled
“Engineering Analysis” is expanded at the right to show its internal workings.
Figure 2.2, is another, similar in kind. The authors, Pahl and Beitz5, note that 
special emphasis is on the iterative nature of the approach and the 
sequence of the steps must not be considered rigid. Some steps might 
be omitted, and others repeated frequently. Such flexibility is in accor-
dance with practical design experience and is very important for the 
application of all design methods.
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  Figure 2.1 The Design Process
Designing, like language, is a social process.   13Finally, Figure 2.3, taken from a more recent mechanical engineering journal6
shows a different sort of vision of design which in some respects is in accord with
my claim that different participants, with different technical responsibilities and
interests, see the object of design differently. The figure depicts “...a three disci-
pline coupled system analysis”. It shows what I would consider three object
worlds; within each of the boxes labeled “disciplines” or “subspaces” I see persons
responsible for the different “state variables” y1, y2, and y3. 
The authors note that “... these state variables are three independent sets” while
the x’s stand for variables which are to be chosen to ultimately optimize the
design. Some of these, xsh, are shared among the three disciplines. The g’s are
equations of constraint. The f’s “...contain the design objectives of disciplines...”
They depend upon the state variables. 
These three representations of design process display similar characteristics:
All but the last suggest that designing is a dynamic process, done in discrete
phases; the similarity of Figures 2.1 and 2.2 to the block diagrams of the controls
engineer is to be noted. But here, while there is feedback referred to as iteration, in
contrast to the diagrams used in a controls analysis there is a definite start and end
to the time-varying process. In Figures 2.1 and 2.2, time begins at the top of the
diagrams and flows on as we move down through the process. There is the possi-
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
     Task
Clarify and define
   the task
Specification
Determine functions
and their structure
Function structures
Search for solution principles
and their combinations
Principles solutions
Divide into realizable
modules
Module structures
Develop layout of
key modules
Preliminary layouts
Complete overall
layout
Definitive layouts
Prepare production and
operating instructions
Product documents
Further realization
Fu
lfi
ll 
an
d 
ad
ap
t r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
Ite
ra
te
 fo
rw
ar
ds
 a
nd
 b
ac
kw
ar
ds
 b
et
w
ee
n 
pr
ev
io
us
 a
nd
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
st
ag
es
 Phases I
 
Phases II
 
Phases III
 Phases IV
                          Figure 2.2 The Design Process: A more complex picture.
14           Chapter  2bility of backstepping and as Paul and Beitz noted, we can even leave out some
steps as we move along. 
The last diagram differs in important ways; the payoff is positioned at the left,
not at the bottom; the flow of time is not acknowledged. And with good reason for
this diagram does not really represent a design process at all but rather a purely
instrumental process – an algorithm – for the determination of design variables and
parameters in an optimum way. All of this is done in an instant by the machine.
This is not to say that this is the actual way the process goes, i.e., as a one shot run
of an optimizing algorithm. The advantage of machinery is that it can be run over
and over again without wear and tear. Put to use in this way, its input, output and
working assumptions can become the ingredients of exchange among the different
parties to the design - assuming they exist. 
We have here different ways of seeing and representing the engineering design
process. Mine expressly champions its social nature - without a block diagram so
far; a second embodied in the models of Dixon, and Pahl and Beitz emphasizing
process but without people - an instrumental or mechanistic process; and a third
which presents designing as a computational algorithm. 
It might be argued that these three are meant to address three different dimen-
sions of design activity: Mine concerned with the organization of the people
charged with the design task, the instrumentalists concerned with the organization
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Designing, like language, is a social process.   15of the work of the design task, and the analysts with decision-making in the later
stages of the process. There is something to this but there is more to the story. This
way of slotting and distinguishing the three representations is in itself too instru-
mental. It smooths over the disjunction I seek to put in relief – that between design
as a purely technical, instrumental process and design as a social process. To label
my vision as organizational is short-sighted and misses the point.
In a way, this faulty characterization of what I am about makes my point. For I
am very much concerned with the form of expression of our authors and partici-
pants in design. My attention to “the voice” of texts and diagrams is purposeful: A
major concern, in this and subsequent essays, is the rhetoric of engineers at work
in designing. My claim is that different forms of expression go hand-in-hand with
different ways of thinking about the world, about the existence of conceptual enti-
ties – their ontological status – and about the meaning and scope of the principles
and requirements of the different paradigmatic sciences that frame thought and
practice within object worlds. My framing of design as a social process in which
different participants work within different object worlds which, in some restricted
sense are incommensurable worlds, leads me to claim they speak different lan-
guages.
Language(s) of Object Worlds7
Of course, participants in design share a common language, their native lan-
guage, e.g., English. And this characterizes the sounds one hears and the words
one reads standing aside any participant working within an object world.   But the
sense and meaning of these expressions heard, voiced and read ought not to be
construed in ordinary terms. For object worlds are worlds where specific scien-
tific/instrumental paradigms fix meaning. There our ordinary language is used in
such a specialized way it is as if a participant is speaking a different language. Not
different in the sense that for you, as a foreigner, a translation would make mean-
ings clear; after all, the words are English, although a technical dictionary would
not be without merit, but different in that knowing and understanding the concepts
and ideas and relationships among the things of an object world require new learn-
ing, like the learning of a foreign language. And the challenge is not just a matter
of coming to grips with, for example, the widespread use of mathematical sym-
bolic expression but, just as getting it right in French or Dutch, Spanish or Japa-
nese means being able to “live” the culture to a degree, so too within object worlds
language is a matter of convention and custom, often curious practices and forms
of expression as well as tokens and grammar, jargon and idiom. 
Each object world language of an engineer is rooted in a particular scientific
paradigm which serves as a basis for conjecture, analysis, testing and designing
within that world. I have already referred to the world of the structural engineer
who speaks of stress and strain; of displacement, stiffness, and load path. These
terms have specialized meaning: stress is both a physical thing, as force per unit
area, and a mathematical thing, as second order, symmetric tensor. It is like the
common word stress, e.g., how you feel when under pressure, in that too much can
16           Chapter  2lead to failure but your common knowledge would not enable you to size the
beams of a bridge, an automobile chassis, or the wing of aeroplane. Stress, strain
and displacement are variables; they are quantifiable; they bear specific units and
dimensions, enter into relations derived from the parent scientific theory using
appropriate kinds of mathematics. 
 I say that an object world language is a proper language: Specialized, yes, dia-
lect, if you like, but more to my point - proper in the sense of the French word
“propre”: A language neat, clean, exact, all in order, honest - at least in its unadul-
terated state. It masquerades as the participant’s natural language but understand-
ing and meaningful expression within object worlds demands more of the native
speaker than proficiency in his or her natural language. A proper language is tech-
nical, instrumental; it has the form of a scientific language, perhaps ornamented
with more things of the world than a true scientist would welcome. It is learned on
the job as well as in disciplinary course-work within schools of engineering. Its
canonical form is codified in handbooks, standards and textbooks. 
A proper language is in good measure analytic. Within the world of the struc-
tural engineer, once one defines stress and strain - the latter, like stress, a second
order, symmetric tensor but physically the measure of deformation at points within
a continuum - then insists upon equilibrium of internal and external forces in
accord with Newton Laws, upon continuity of displacement, and finally inserts
some parameters to stand in for the elasticity of the material one can, in principle,
derive precise statements that fix the stress levels in the beams of the bridge, the
specification-meeting shape of the members of the automobile chassis, and the fre-
quency of vibration of the fluttering wing of an airplane. I say “in good measure”
because in application, an individual’s experience and traditional ways of doing
things enter at many stages shaping and fixing presumptions, assumptions, heuris-
tics and approximations - and this in the crafting of prototypes and setting of test
methods as well as in formulating a crude or sophisticated mathematical model. As
with Gilbert Ryle,8 knowing how is just as important as knowing that within object
worlds. Still the prevailing mind set is analytic, a fact displayed most clearly in the
inhabitant’s manipulation of mathematical relations, their programming in code
for computer analysis - a business of reduction and analysis within a closed sym-
bolic and ideological domain. 
The languages of different object worlds are different; their proper languages
are different. In another world apart from the structural engineer, the electronics
engineer speaks not of stress and strain but of power, voltages and currents, ana-
logue and digital, resistance and capacitance. The mathematics may appear similar
– there are strict analogies that apply in some instances – but the world of elec-
tronics is different, populated by different variables, time scales, units, scientific
law and principles of operation. So too, different kinds of heuristics, metaphor,
norms and knowledge as codified, tacit and know-how.   
Participants within object worlds function as elites. But the case is different
from that pictured by the philosopher Hillary Putnam.9 Object worlds divide the
design task into different, but not independent, kinds of effort so one can say that
there is a “division of linguistic labour” but the distinction is not that there is one
Designing, like language, is a social process.   17group, an elite, that knows the full meaning, has a god’s eye view, of the object of
design and another group with but a less sophisticated, common understanding of
the design task. Rather there are multiple elites, each with their own proper lan-
guage. It is in this sense that different participants within different object worlds
with different competencies, responsibilities and interests speak different lan-
guages. Crudely put, one speaks structures, another electronics, another manufac-
turing processes, still another marketing, etc.
The elements of an object world language are more than words, more than the
symbols and tokens of a proper language displayed by a particular scientific para-
digm. I have already pointed to specialized instruments, prototypical bits of hard-
ware, tools, ways of graphically representing states and processes as ingredients of
object worlds. These all can be considered linguistic elements for that is how they
function. 
A sketch or more formal drawing is part of the language of design. A sketch,
like a word or statement, say of an electrical circuit, can have multifaceted mean-
ing depending upon context and intentions. Elements of a sketch may be taken
from a lexicon and there are rules, regulative and constitutive, to be abided by in
the drawing if the statement is to bear the author’s intended sense and meaning;
but meaning is far from exhausted by these rules and iconic features alone. A
sketch, in what it leaves out as much as what is included, conveys notions of the
object’s function as well as constitution and signals both what is essential and
what can be neglected. 
There are other kinds of artifacts constructed in designing that may be consid-
ered linguistic. Consider, for example, a model of a vehicle crafted for use in a
wind tunnel test: A physical model of this sort is as much a part of the analysis of
the performance of the vehicle as is the mathematical/symbolic representation
done in the proper language of aerodynamics. Its meaning is fixed in good measure
by mathematical representation but not fully exploited and revealed until actually
placed in a wind tunnel and put to the test. Its implications for setting specifica-
tions of the full blown object, the vehicle in the flesh so to speak, are direct. There
is a mapping of the quantitative results of the test onto the big world vehicle. But I
emphasize that specifications that follow from this conversation are not compre-
hensive for they speak only to certain properties of the vehicle, e.g., its frontal
shape, the limits of dimensions of appendages and the like. For the aerodynami-
cist’s dimensions are of a different type than those of the structural engineer. The
model is not simply a geometrically scaled down version of the proposed object:
Physical parameters such as the viscosity and density of air and the velocity of the
anticipated airstream through which the vehicle moves enter, along with geometri-
cal measures, into the scaling. The wind tunnel model will appear something like
the big one but close inspection reveals it is distorted. We might say it looks like
English but it isn’t, or that the aerodynamicists sees the object of design in a pecu-
liar way, in the light of a particular projection10.
The icons that refer to the elements of an electrical circuit, deployed within the
object world of the participant responsible for the design of the electronics, are
more easily recognized as different from the physical elements themselves. Still,
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meaning in use is only known when made part of a circuit displayed in a sketch.
Only then can one begin to think about whether a 5% resistor will suffice, what
power rating should be specified, answer the question whether it provides the right
RC time constant, whether it can be packaged in an array, or even what unit cost is
tolerable. The tokens of object worlds point and refer but their full meaning is only
constructed and revealed in the context of an object world narrative.
It is not that the persons of one world are not familiar to a degree with the lan-
guage of another’s world. The practitioner of any one of these worlds might have
studied the content of another as part of their schooling. But studying a language
in school is one thing; living and managing in the foreign country is another. Dif-
ferences in context - material and conceptual - methods and instruments, codes and
rules, webs of practices matter.
It should be clear from the way these linguistic elements have been described
that they do not simply refer to the object in a static sense - by which I mean
depicting different aspects, states, structure and properties of some fixed and final
product - but rather are meant to describe and explain the function of the object of
design, how it might work, when it might not, and/or the processes required to
develop and produce it.   They can be viewed as attempts to capture in material
form, in a picture, a model, or a prototype, the counter factual nature of designing.
Talk around, over and about them takes the form: “If we alter the airfoil shape in
this manner, then the drag will be reduced by this percentage”; “If we go with the
5% resistors, our unit costs will drop by half a percent”.   Even a computational
algorithm for Multiobjective Collaborative Optimization can be an artifact which
facilitates social choice and exchange when put on the table and contested,
reworked, tuned to the satisfaction of those responsible for local, disciplinary
effort. 
The construction and use of these varied artifacts enables negotiations among
engineers designing. The things themselves are transient; varied in form, and in
the process of design, in the hectic, energetic give and take, decision making and
iteration, negotiation and trade off, they are active elements of a living language -
shaped, specialized, reformed, extended, provoking new thought, confirming con-
jecture. I quote Searle.11
“The unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been 
supposed, the symbol, word or sentence, but rather the production or 
issuance of the symbol or word or sentence...” 
Bridging object worlds
Given this “tower of babel” vision of design process, one might wonder how it
succeeds. (We note that it doesn’t always do so). Well, there are methods for
bringing the proposals and preferences, claims and requirements of participants of
different object worlds into coherence. We have already shown two prescriptions.
But how to handle the disparities I have described?
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design effort, of any complexity whatsoever, is to first sit down and try to break up
the task into a set of subtasks which might be independently pursued. Usually this
will be done in terms of different functions the object of design must perform.
Once these subsystems and subtasks have been defined and lines are drawn around
them, certain “interface requirements” must be constructed and adhered to by indi-
viduals working in any two different domains. If such independently pursued tasks
can be established, then participants would hardly have occasion to meet together
save at some final step at which point the design would be assembled. 
I claim that this is generally impossible. Not that one should not try to go as far
as one can in this direction, but rather because the specification of any property,
the setting of any design parameter, may be of interest to participants of different
object worlds, defining interface requirements is a real challenge. Indeed, where
do you draw the boundaries in the first place? And how should these boundaries be
conceived? In terms of function or in terms of morphology? 
In some design tasks the intensity of interaction among different object worlds
might be minimal, e.g., for a product which is a re-design of last year’s model, last
year’s organization will serve and object world language differences matter less. A
tested pattern for interaction exists and provides a framework for interaction. But
for truly innovative projects, e.g., the first products of a start-up, uncertainties
abound and where to set boundaries, how to break up the task, is problematic. In
this case, one can not foresee all of the interactions that will be required among
participants working within different worlds, now organized around subtasks. One
observes in this case that interface requirements are themselves subject to redesign
and negotiation as design proceeds. 
Granted this, we might still look for some strictly rational, instrumental meth-
ods for reconciling the differences of participants, a sort of over-arching, object
world proper language to employ to our benefit. We have already seen one illustra-
tion of how this might be achieved. The scheme of Tappeta and Renaud for Multi
objective Collaborative Optimization is meant to, not simply reconcile and harmo-
nize the requirements of the different disciplines (I would say “of the partici-
pants”) but to achieve an optimum resolution of their conflicting preferences. 
Let us consider how this is accomplished. Each discipline has its own design
objective - the fi which are a function of some subset of the design variables - some
of which are shared. To reconcile these in an optimum way, a global objective, a
“...system objective function” is defined as
 where the wi are some numbers, “weights”, which express the relative significance
of the requirements of the different n disciplines12:
These design objectives are often conflicting and an assessment of the 
relative importance is needed for the multiobjective formulation.... In 
this paper it is assumed that the relative importance of each discipline 
F xo( ) wi fi⋅
i 1=
n
∑=
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weighted method transforms the multiobjective function to a single 
system level objective function. (emphasis mine)
Now, where do these weightings come from? And why do they use the phrase a
priori? This latin phrase means something special to, not just philosophers, but
most of the rest of us. Why don’t they just say “established beforehand”? But then,
who does the assigning? God? The project manager? The customer, client or user?
The use of the passive voice leaves us with little to go on. 
Here, no doubt, is where the social intrudes. Deciding upon values for the
weights will most likely require negotiation among the different participants
responsible for different tasks. One might imagine a dictator making the choice but
upon what knowledge base might such an omniscient agent derive his or her
authority – not to speak of how such a strategy would violate most modern,
enlightened managerial norms? 
My claim is that the problem of bringing into coherence, none the less optimiz-
ing, the requirements and objectives (or needs) of different participants from dif-
ferent object worlds always exists at some level, somewhere within the design
process. Setting a boundary to that process close-in and intoning “a priori” may
free one from the messy business of social choice but one ought not then pretend
that in this way one can dismiss the problem of harmonizing the interests of differ-
ent participants by instrumental means alone.
Another way to make the claim is to say that direct translation among the dif-
ferent proper languages of object worlds is not possible. Comparison of the propo-
sitions and requirements of different participants requires the use of a more
common or vulgar language. Here now the artifacts we have characterized as ele-
ments of language continue to function as such: Sketches made by an individual in
his or her own private discourse will be dragged out for all to see, serving now as a
cruder framework for the person’s explanation and proposals. Whereas before they
prompted detailed and exact knowledge, now they, in their new found ambiguity,
provide an arena for sometimes heated, sometimes creative, deliberation and deci-
sion-making.
Claiming direct translation is not possible is akin to claiming object worlds are
incommensurable. This is correct, if we take a disciplined, narrow view of the sub-
stance of such places, i.e., if we restrict our attention to the particular mathemati-
cal theories and abstract models, the variables in whose terms they are expressed,
the special methods and instrumentation, codified protocols for putting their pecu-
liar artifacts to the test, etc. The stress at the root of a cantilever beam is of another
world than the open circuit voltage of a photovoltaic module. But if we stand
above the fray of negotiations and collaboration, and take a broader view, we find
common ground – a system of shared beliefs about how the world works, what
makes it go around, whether your world or mine. 
There is the mutual trust in abstraction itself. While the model of the electronic
behavior of a photovoltaic cell is worlds apart from the model of the stress distri-
bution in a cantilever beam, both the electronic engineer and the structural engi-
neer trust in the efficacy of their respective abstractions to adequately depict what
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work within their respective domains. Both rely heavily upon mathematical, sym-
bolic expression, though one may make heavy use of partial differential equations,
the other Boolean logic. And while their sketches and diagrams are of different
form, their lines will be precise, their circles and boxes closed, their annotations
cryptic but clear - in contrast to the productions of architects at a similar stage in
design. 
Both share the same belief in cause leading to effect: Given circumstances A,
event B will follow. But, more specifically, both claim to be able to quantify, to
measure the relevant ingredients of A and those of B. If the solar flux onto the
module is 1 kilowatt per square meter and the ambient temperature is 20 degrees
centigrade, then the maximum power available out of the module will be 60 watts.
If the weight at the end of the cantilever is 100 pounds, and the beam itself weights
20 pounds, then the maximum stress at the root of the beam will be 4000 pounds
per square inch.
Both can demand of the other verification of proposals and claims via the test-
ing of hardware and prototypes constructed in accord with the concepts, principles
and purposes of their respective worlds. Each will accept the other’s ceteris pari-
bus stipulations, explicit or implied, as these are part and parcel of the conceptual
schemes of different and independent object worlds. 
Both take a strictly instrumental view of their productions – of knowledge, of
function. Simplicity is valued. Being in control is valued. The two go together.
Technical perfection, e.g., optimization, is possible within object worlds. Color is
generally irrelevant; aesthetics is secondary; even costs garner little respect -
although of course they have to be dealt with. So too codes and regulations, mar-
keting directives, lawyers warnings, the CEO’s proclamations – these are all ingre-
dients of design but life within object worlds can go on without them, indeed,
much more neatly without them.
   
There, in more than a nutshell, is my way of seeing engineering design/design-
ing engineers. Different participants with different responsibilities, competencies
and interests, speak different languages when working, for the most part alone, in
their respective domains. For this to ring true, we ought to construe language in the
broadest terms - to include the sketch, the prototype, the charts even a computer
algorithm as elements employed in the productive exchange among participants.
But individual effort within some disciplinary matrix does not suffice: Designing
is a social process; it requires exchange and negotiation as well as intense work
within object worlds. 
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3What engineers don’t know & why they believe it.That engineers may not know something, or that they don’t know something,
will be generally accepted as fact, though the impression given by some might be
otherwise. But it may strike you as presumptuous, that I, or anyone else for that
matter, might be able to describe what it is they do not know. More problematic, I
want my essay to have meaning to engineers themselves so that, while admittedly,
there is much that engineers don’t know - e.g., how to juggle, the words to the
national anthem of the Netherlands, who won the world cup in 1986 - our concern
is with that which they don’t know which is relevant to their day-to-day existence
and professional practice - that which they should or ought to know or would be
better off if they did know.
The chapter title as a whole might strike the reader as a bit of a muddle. I could
straighten it out by adding a qualification, to wit: “What engineers don’t know
with certainty but (and) why they believe it to be the case”. But this weakens the
claim too much; it rules out important cases of “not knowing”, e.g., the possibility
that the “it” can be that which is unknown, un-thought-of, unmentioned, unseen,
unheard, unfelt, unimaginable. I don’t want to rule out this possibility; hence I will
not amend my title1. 
Knowledge presumes belief; belief rests upon trust; trust is a social matter;
trust binds beliefs and people together, pervading the different contexts within
which the engineer must function. Within the context of the design task itself,
there is the trust among participants of different object worlds. Within any object
world one trusts in the integrity of the dictates and heuristics of the defining tech-
nical paradigm. Within the context of a supporting infrastructure, engineers rely
upon the claims and promises of suppliers, subcontractors, parts manufacturers.
And users and customers are trusted to behave, to respond as imagined and speci-
fied. 
Introducing “trust” as an essential aspect of engineering work is one of a piece
with viewing what engineers do as social as well as scientific. The challenge of
this enquiry is to relate engineering thought and practice seen as a social, as well
as an instrumental process, to engineering thought and practice seen as a subject
for philosophical critique and analysis. I try to straddle both worlds, of social
study and philosophy, holding as I do that by entertaining both perspectives we can
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they do, and how they might do better. 
We begin by noting that within all design contexts there are uncertainties.
Some of these may be identified explicitly, given probabilistic expression and
thereby brought within an object world for instrumental assessment. But there
remains the possibility that what we believe will not prove to be the case. What-
ever the context, there are (yet to be) relevant things engineers don’t know, and yet
they believe and trust they are in control. 
The suggestion that engineers don’t know as much about the integrity of their
productions as they believe to be the case is prompted by the simple observation
encapsulated in ‘Murphy’s Law’ i.e., that if things can, things do go wrong. Prod-
ucts, processes, systems fail. In this chapter, I want to explore the nature of techni-
cal failure and how engineers and other participants in the technological enterprise
cope with malfunction and attempt to set things right. I am interested in whether
philosophy is relevant in any way to developing a better understanding of this kind
of engineering practice, making clear, on the one hand, what might be changed to
improve practice and what, on the other hand, must necessarily remain problem-
atic.
The Nature of Technical Failure 
What constitutes mis-behavior, a failure event? Some are obvious: The Hyatt
Regency walkway fails dramatically under the load it was designed for causing the
loss of life and limb. The Tacoma Narrows bridge oscillates so wildly in the wind,
it collapses. But other events, most perhaps, are not so easy to identify as failure,
none the less uncover their cause. The “yield” of an industrial process, say for the
production of silicon wafers destined to be computer chips, is not as high as
desired some claim. Others argue that the yield is good enough - and besides, the
cost of improvement of the production process is not justified. So “failure”, mal-
function, can be a matter of degree. The software application when run within a
particular operating system hides a dialogue box when I return to the main window
displayed on my monitor. Is this a “bug” or a “feature”? 
So whether misbehavior is deemed significant or even to be defined as such
depends upon who you ask. Malfunction can be described and defined with respect
to a set of performance specifications; with respect to the expectations of partici-
pants in design; or with respect to the expectations of users. These are different,
more or less independent referents: A product or system may fail to meet a specifi-
cation yet satisfy the customer. Alternatively a product may meet all specifications
yet not satisfy a participant in design and may, or may not satisfy all or any users.
And, of course, a product may meet specifications and designers expectations yet
fail in the marketplace.2
Failure is related to the quality of a product - the other side of the coin so to
speak. And just as the quality is difficult to define (good to, or for whom?) so too
what is seen as failure is not a wholly objective matter. For the purposes of this
essay, I will take failure of a technical production as that event which engenders,
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design, making, operation and/or maintenance. 
In this sense, failure is a social construct. That is, whether an event is labeled a
failure depends upon the beliefs, judgements and claims of persons concerned with
the event – claims which are taken seriously by those responsible for the design,
making, operation and maintenance of the product or system who themselves, of
course, are persons so concerned.   These “participants” in the construction of fail-
ure may be a varied lot, each with a different perspective on the product’s nature,
its function and use. As in design, where different individuals see the same object
of design differently in accord with their technical competencies, responsibilities
and interests, so too in the construction and analysis of error, different concerned
parties will see the failure event and its ingredients differently. Defining failure is
a social process.3 
Diagnosing failure
Once a malfunctioning has been defined, the search for a cause begins. Finding
the cause, one can then try to fix matters so it doesn’t happen again. Diagnosing
technical failure is not too different from any effort which, when confronted with
the symptoms of illness, one strives to move beyond the appearances to expose the
source and reasons for the malfunction. For this, in engineering as in medicine,
there are certain strategies.
When things go wrong, when your product or system mis-behaves and surprises
you or, more ambiguously only suggests that something is out of order, the first
task is to try to replicate the failure, to establish conditions such that, when we set
the system in motion, the faulty behavior re-appears.4 In this way we can construct
a fuller description of the problem, stating under what conditions and with what
settings the fault occurs. 
A next step, if we are successful in replicating the malfunction - and this with
some consistency - is to change conditions in some way and observe the result. We
seek to make a relevant difference in conditions - relevant in that it alters the state
of the product in some significant way - and then note if this alteration does, or
does not, eliminate the failure. Our traditional strategy recommends that we
change but one condition at a time, proceeding in this way until a cause of the fail-
ure is identified, i.e., the system stands corrected and now runs as it should.
In this process, we ordinarily have more than the product alone to work with.
Drawing upon our knowledge of how the artifact was designed – i.e., in accord
with certain scientific concepts, principles and instrumental methods– we can con-
struct a mathematical representation or physical scale model of it’s behavior and
put this to the test. Indeed, we most likely already have these alternatives available
since they are essential to designing in the first place. 
Sometimes a model may be the only feasible way to test alternative scenarios;
the real artifact may be inaccessible for one reason or another. Still, this may suf-
fice: For, with the model in hand, we can alter inputs and/or parameter settings and
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the faulty behavior. 
This was the challenge faced by engineers at NASA when a solar panel on the
Mars Global Surveyor failed to deploy.5 The Global Surveyor, launched in
November of 1996, was designed to travel from Earth to Mars, there go into a cir-
cular orbit and collect data about the geological nature of the planet. As the insert
reports, one of the two solar panels evidently failed to fully deploy shortly after
launch. The primary concern expressed in this news release was the effect of the
failure on accomplishing the mission’s objectives. At the time, engineers con-
cluded that the skewed panel would not significantly impair the spacecraft’s per-
formance. (Perhaps this is why the failure is not labeled as such but referred to as
“the situation”). This conclusion was reached using computer-simulated models
and engineering tests - the latter referring to tests of duplicate hardware compo-
nents designed to drive and control the deployment of the solar panels - for the
failed artifact was not available. 
What was available was a stream of data sent back from the spacecraft i.e.,
“...two weeks of spacecraft telemetry and Global Surveyor’s picture-perfect per-
formance during the first trajectory maneuver...”. That the panel had not fully
deployed might have been made evident if the craft had been instrumented to sig-
nal ground control when latched into the desired final position. That the panel was
shy by 20 degrees might have been inferred from the electrical output of the photo-
voltaic array as a whole. Just what the “picture-perfect” performance had to do
with the diagnosis is not clear but the phrase tends to lead one to attribute too
much to what they did “see”. For it was the ground-base computer models and
engineering tests, together with the telemetry data alone, which provided a basis
for an explanation of why the panel had failed to deploy fully, not any photo-
graphic, video, or film image. At any rate, though they could not see the space-
craft, they had sufficient reason to believe one panel had not fully deployed. What
caused the damper arm to break is not explained nor conjectured.
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 When restricted in this way to the use of an abstract representation alone, we
must ask if the model is good enough, e.g., conceptually adequate, complete, and
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE   November 27, 1996 
GLOBAL SURVEYOR SOLAR PANEL WILL NOT HINDER MISSION GOALS 
Mission engineers studying a solar array on NASA's Mars Global Surveyor that did not 
fully deploy during the spacecraft's first day in space have concluded that the situation 
will not significantly impair Surveyor's ability to aerobrake into its mapping orbit or affect 
its performance during the cruise and science portions of the mission. 
The solar panel under analysis is one of two 3.5-meter (11- foot) wings that were unfolded 
shortly after the Nov. 7 launch are used to power Global Surveyor. Currently the so-called 
-Y array is tilted 20.5 degrees away from its fully deployed and latched position. 
“After extensive investigation with our industrial partner, Lockheed Martin Astronautics, 
using a variety of computer- simulated models and engineering tests, we believe the tilted 
array poses no extreme threat to the mission,” said Glenn Cunningham, Mars Global Sur-
veyor project manager at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory. “We plan to carry out some 
activities in the next couple of months using the spacecraft's electrically driven solar array 
positioning actuators to try to gently manipulate the array so that it drops into place. Even 
if we are not able to fully deploy the array, we can orient it during aerobraking so that the 
panel will not be a significant problem.” 
Diagnosis of the solar array position emerged from two weeks of spacecraft telemetry and 
Global Surveyor's picture-perfect performance during the first trajectory maneuver, which 
was conducted on Nov. 21. The 43-second burn achieved a change in spacecraft velocity 
of about 27 meters per second (60 miles per hour), just as expected. The burn was per-
formed to move the spacecraft on a track more directly aimed toward Mars, since it was 
launched at a slight angle to prevent its Delta third-stage booster from following a trajec-
tory that would collide with the planet. 
Both the telemetry data and ground-based computer models indicate that a piece of metal 
called the “damper arm,” which is part of the solar array deployment mechanism at the 
joint where the entire panel is attached to the spacecraft, probably broke during the panel's 
initial rotation and was trapped in the 2-inch space between the shoulder joint and the 
edge of the solar panel, Cunningham said. 
Engineers at JPL and Lockheed Martin Astronautics, Denver, CO, are working to develop 
a process to clear the obstruction by gently moving the solar panel. The damper arm con-
nects the panel to a device called the “rate damper,” which functions in much the same 
way as the hydraulic closer on a screen door acts to limit the speed at which the door 
closes. In Surveyor's case, the rate damper was used to slow the motion of the solar panel 
as it unfolded from its stowed position.
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the model as is, without changing the formal structure of the latter; i.e., we change
an input condition or parameter and replicate the malfunction. In other cases we
find we must change the structure of the model. In this case we will fault the
model as well as the artifact. (The design was in accord with the model). In either
case we take action and then claim a fix, believing and trusting in our new picture.
But how do we know the model, even if updated, is an adequate representation of
the real thing? Might not we be missing some relevant detail? Might not there be
other conditions which would result in the same faulty behavior?6
Indeed, as the Global Surveyor entered the outer fringes of the Mars atmo-
sphere and the “aerobraking phase” of the mission began - a maneuver intended to
bring the craft into the desired, final circular orbit about the planet - NASA engi-
neer’s picture of the failure had to be repainted: The braking force on the
unlatched panel moved the panel past its latched position. This meant that some-
thing more than a broken damper arm was involved as a “cause” of failure (else
why wouldn’t the panel have latched)? Engineers now conjectured that a support-
ing structure at the interface where the deployment mechanism met the body of the
spacecraft had failed. The immediate fix, if it can be called that, included perform-
ing the aerobraking maneuvers at a slower rate which, though changing the craft’s
final orbit about Mars, would not detract from meeting the mission’s objectives.
Even, in general, if the actual artifact is available for diagnostics, the strategy
sketched out above has lacunae. Consider the first step - replicating the failure.
Even if successful in this, we are not justified nor have any sure basis in claiming
that the set of conditions that precipitates the malfunction observed is the only set
of conditions that might result in the same symptoms, the same failure; nor, for
that matter, are we justified in claiming that the next time we set these same condi-
tions the failure will be made evident. For, in the latter case, if there remains some
condition that is not under our purview but is relevant and, conjoined with others
on our list, alters the state of the world such that the machine works as it should,
we will be pleasantly surprised, or rather frustrated, in this outcome. We can never
be sure that “all other things remain equal”.
Underwriting this critique is the claim that a design is under-determined in the
sense that all possible ‘behaviors’ (i.e., functioning, workings, states, input-output
response) are never fully determined or forecast in the course of the design pro-
cess.7 There are at least three sources for under-determination: Within object
worlds there are limits to predictability due, in part, to lack of resources e.g., time,
or inability to fully replicate the context of use. Then too, some ‘inputs’ are diffi-
cult to capture in an analytical mode, e.g., parameters which are difficult to quan-
tify, their range uncertain. How does one model the quality of maintenance or the
possibility of an antagonistic, or even ill-intended user? While some uncertainties
might be dealt with probabilistically, there are still other features which remain
unknown. 
A more problematic source of under-determinacy lies in the unanticipated
interaction among the design contributions of participants from different object
worlds. It is difficult to predict all the interactions across the interfaces established
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details of all contexts of use be anticipated. Analytical exactness and completeness
may hold within object worlds but the behavior of the whole, in a sense, is not
fully defined by the behavior of its parts. It is this fundamental feature of design-
ing which both makes engineering the challenge that it is and denies the possibility
of achieving technical perfection.
It also reveals the naivete of viewing of engineering design as the straight for-
ward, rational application of science. There is indeed a resonance here with science - in
the philosophical position that holds that one can never fully verify a scientific theory. But
note a contrast with the scientific enterprise: With the latter, one strives to deduce all sig-
nificant consequences of the theory. In engineering, one strives to ensure that the product
meets some limited and prescribed specifications whatever else it might do, or be encour-
aged to do.
Under-determinacy insures as well that the challenge of diagnosing error (or
anomaly) will require more than the application of rational, instrumental method.
While engineers may believe and trust in the integrity of their productions made in
accord with the dictates of object world instrumental thought and practice – having
no reason to judge otherwise – there still remains the possibility, nay probability of
things going wrong once the product is launched out into the world. 
A scenario: Failure of a truss structure.
 Here I construct a simple example of the complexities of diagnosing failure. It
is a thought experiment; my intent is to bridge the disconnect between philosophy
and engineering by adopting a well known scenario of philosophers which con-
cerns criteria for knowledge claims. As such it is story of what might in fact occur
- a scenario within a possible world. No where do I violate the second law of ther-
modynamics. My report is in complete accord with the dictates of object world
thought and practice in structural engineering. 
The figure shows a bracket meant to support a weight at point C. This could be
a shelf bracket, for example, or support for a sign, or even a critical substructure of
a weapon’s system – no matter. 
The arrangement is commonly known as a “truss
structure”. The arrows indicate the directions of the
force exerted on the point C by the weight W and of the
vertical component of the displacement, d, of the point
C.   The magnitude of the displacement depends upon
the magnitude of the load, the material out of which the
truss members are made, their lengths and cross-sec-
tional areas. There is a theory, that of “elasticity” or
more immediately, that of the “strength of materials”,
which enables a structural engineer to predict the mag-
nitude of displacement given this information.
In my scenario, as well as in general, the system
meets specifications if, when loaded with the anticipated weight, W, the structure
A
B
D
                          C
W
 d
Figure 3.1 A truss structure
30           Chapter  3retains its shape - there is but a small, mostly vertical displacement of the point C
when loaded. Of course, it is possible that the tension or compression in any one of
the three members might become excessive - say as the load W was increased
without limit - and a member breaks, fractures, or deforms excessively like a soft
plastic. This would certainly be considered failure. 
In my particular scenario, it was specified that the displacement d due to the
anticipated load W ought not to exceed a certain limit, i.e., the structure was to
exhibit a certain minimum “stiffness”. The properties of the three steel members -
their cross-sectional areas - were chosen to ensure that the displacement remained
within the prescribed bounds when the maximum value of the anticipated load was
applied.
When put to the test, however, the structure proved more flexible than desired.
At the anticipated load levels, the displacement of point C was excessive. Hence,
the structure did not meet specification, though the members did not break at the
design loading.
Confronted with this deficiency, a fix was proposed and accepted. The bottom
member, DC, was replaced by a stiffer member, one with 20% more cross-sec-
tional area, so that the overall stiffness of the structure was likewise increased by a
comparable percentage. Tests showed the new structure met specifications; the
displacement at the anticipated load was no longer considered excessive. All was
put back in order; the structure could be released for use. It was believed it would
now behave in accord with specifications.
Unfortunately, when installed in the field, the bracket was fastened upside-
down to the wall; i.e., member DC, the stiff member was located on top, AC, the
not-so-stiff member, positioned and fastened to the wall at the bottom. When the
structure was loaded with the weight W, the displacement observed, when the mag-
nitude of W reached the design load, was again excessive and, what was worse,
appeared to be increasing at an alarming rate with each small increment in the
value of the load. 
Upon closer inspection, it was discovered that the member AC, now in com-
pression, had experienced major deviation from a straight line; it had “buckled”.
This explained why a small increase in load in the vicinity of the allowable load
level engendered very large additional vertical displacement of the node C.
Why did it fail? If the truss had been installed “correctly”, i.e., with member
AC located on top, it would not have failed; the laboratory conditions would have
prevailed in the field. But this was not the case; the context changed; no one con-
sidered the possibility that the structure would be installed upside down.
To be “unthought-of”, not considered, is to remain “unknown”. The claim here
is that there will always be a potentially problematic state of affairs not consid-
ered, overlooked, unimagined, unconstructed, no matter how many safety proce-
dures one invokes or how imaginative and free wheeling your brainstorming
session about possible contexts of use may be.
Oh, but you say: “Your scenario has a point but any engineer worth his or her
salt would display better design practice. Surely one would have tested the truss in
both configurations and stiffened up the structure in other ways to make it accord
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stiffer members.” 
No doubt? Surely this could not happen? What kind of a response is that? Of
course I am allowed my doubts. What justification, how can one be so sure? Where
have I erred in my scenario?
Another might chime in: “I would design it so that it would be installed in the
proper configuration - the simplest thing would be to add a label, i.e., ‘this end
up’; or better yet, design it so that it can only be installed in one way, the correct
way. Do this by making the angle that the top member makes with the horizontal,
less than that of the bottom member. Then since the wall sockets are in place, there
is only one way the truss could possibly be installed”.
The latter’s advice was taken, and member AC then met the horizontal at a shal-
low angle. The system was again deployed. But once again the behavior was like
before - excessive displacement at the design load and evidence of non-linear
increase in displacement with load. This time, however, inspection showed that the
bottom member had not buckled; rather the top member AC had deformed dramat-
ically in tension – much more than it should have. How could this be? After all, the
members had been chosen to support the anticipated load. 
A “root cause analysis” conducted with all participants in assembly as well as
design and manufacturing revealed that member AC had been fabricated a bit short.
When installed it had to be stretched, pretensioned to connect up to support point
A at the wall. This pretension, together with the additional tension engendered
when the load was applied at C, exceeded the yield stress of the material.
And so it can go...
While whatever fix I make within the scenario eliminates from the realm of
possibility one more failure mode; whatever additional recommendation you make
for improving the design process, e.g., let’s improve quality control; whatever
redundancies you might add to the system to take care of whatever odd circum-
stances of the context of use you are able to forecast; whatever retreat to probabi-
listic construction of acceptable risk of failure you make; I can always imagine a
new state of affairs, conditions within a possible world - in designing, in manufac-
turing, in assembly, in packaging, in use, in maintenance - which would be un-
accounted for, unthought of, and which would engender failure (in the mind of
someone).
This scenario is not so much a fantasy as suggested: In attempts to ensure
safety-in-use of a new product, participants in design will themselves play out sce-
narios of possibilities which might endanger the user. The claim here is that the set
of possibilities will never be complete; there will remain the possibility that some
“idiot” will, against all expectations, do something that will endanger his welfare
or that of society.8 My scenario is about a simple truss structure; it is chosen as
simple as possible to show that even in such cases the possible existence of
unknowns leads to the conclusion that one can never fully verify a design. One
need not consider so called “complex systems” to make the point.
I now alter this story to make an explicit connection with philosophy: This
revised scenario is meant to contrast with one advanced by Gettier.9
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and sufficient conditions for someone knowing a proposition, p, is true. One such
set of conditions has the form:
s knows that p   if and only if
(i) p is true
(ii) s believes that p, and
(iii) s is justified in believing that p.
I illustrate, as Gettier did, that this set does not work: 
Suppose Jane is a new hire recently charged with indeterminate truss customer
relations. She arrives on the scene after the first fix was made - her predecessor
had signed-off on increasing the stiffness of the bottom member, DC, but reports
were coming in that this, in some cases, had not solved the problem. Last week,
there was a report of a wrong-headed installation and a buckled bottom member. 
This week, she gets a call from a customer who complains of excessive dis-
placement under a specified, allowable load. Jane goes to observe on site the per-
formance of the truss. Unfortunately, the customer has encased the structure within
Gettier tells the following story which shows that these conditions are not sufficient to 
enable one to claim that “s knows that p”.
Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evi-
dence for the following conjunctive proposition:
     (d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
Smiths’s evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that 
Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones’s 
pocket ten minutes ago.   
Proposition (d) entails:
     (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e) and accepts (e) on the 
grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in 
believing that (e) is true.
But imagine further that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, 
also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then 
true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example then, 
all of the following are true:
(i) (e) is true
(ii) Smith believes that (e) is true
(iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true.
But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of 
the number of coins in Smith’s pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in 
Smith’s pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones’s pocket, whom 
he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.
Gettier, E.L., “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis, 23.6, June 1963 pp 121-123.
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only how the node C displaces as the load W is increased. (Here note that, though
the artifact is available, it is not available to the full extent that Jane would like).
She takes the data back to the office and indeed confirms that the displacement is
excessive and appears even to be a bit non-linear. In the lab, she sets up the truss
“upside-down”, loads point C with the allowable weight W, and observes the onset
of buckling.
Jane has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:
(d) the truss was installed upside down and the top, now bottom, member had
buckled.
Jane’s evidence for (d) might be the precedent cited above and Jane’s own test
of the truss, configured upside down in the lab - which did indeed produce onset of
buckling at the design load. 
She posits:
(e) Increasing the cross-sectional area of the top (AC) member will rectify the
problem.
But imagine further that, unknown to Jane, when the protective housing was
installed the truss was set in the right orientation but an interference was encoun-
tered at the top junction where the member would normally be fastened to the wall
and that the top member (AC) was subsequently placed under considerable pre-
stress when the force fit to the wall was made. Under the design load, plastic
deformation occurred in the top member which in turn caused the excessive verti-
cal displacement at C. Despite this, carrying through the fix in accord with (e) will
solve the problem.
Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Jane inferred
(e), is false. In our example then, all of the following are true:
(i) (e) is true
(ii) Jane believes that (e) is true
(iii) Jane is justified in believing that (e) is true.
But it is equally clear that Jane does not know that (e) is true; for (e) is true in
virtue of the plastic deformation of the top member, AC, while Jane does not know
of the plastic deformation of the top member and bases her belief in (e) on the
buckling of the bottom member which she falsely believes to be the cause of the
failure.
This Gettier type counter-example to the three conditions for what might count
as knowledge, patterned on one of the scenario’s found in Gettier’s own article
(see the boxed text), is one in which Jane has a justified but false belief, i.e., (d),
by inference from which she justifiably believes something which happens to be
true, (e), and so arrives at a justified true belief which is not knowledge.10
Now I am not going to pursue how philosophers have contended with Gettier’s
counter-example, have tried to amend the conditions for knowledge so that the
counter-example looses its force or built upon his provocation to redefine condi-
tions for knowledge. But I do find something provocative in his challenge, some-
thing that I think has relevance to the task of ensuring the integrity of our technical
productions, or at least acknowledging the limits in design. As my adoption of Get-
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havior might not prevent our making a legitimate fix. The problem with this is that
this “false knowledge” - if I can call it that - while it may serve our immediate pur-
pose, is very likely to bring us trouble in the future. 
If I were to offer a recommendation, it would be that the engineer might do well
to adopt the perspective and attitude of the skeptic when challenged with the task
of diagnosing failure. While there are rules and heuristics, block diagrams and
instrumental, rational methods for dealing with a malfunctioning production, one
can never know for sure whether one has a solution for all times, all contexts, for
all possible worlds.
A more complex world 
This last scenario, together with my crude description of diagnostic practice, is
abstract, theoretical and meant to make evident, even in the simplest of cases, the
challenge of determining the cause of technical failure. While providing some
sense of the limits to engineering knowledge and knowing, it stands apart from the
world of actual practice. It is like the block diagrams of design process – those
abstract and aloof prescriptions for designing displayed in my first Chapter. Recall
that the latter representations are all about method; all focused on the product;
there are no persons there within their boxes and borders. They imply that the
design task may be the sole responsibility of a single agent - an individual, a firm,
an institution - we know not which. There is nothing “social” in them. So too in
Gettier’s world: Jane, Smith and Jones, are hard to see as social agents. But that is
irrelevant to the meaning of the story: What matters is that their exchange, the
propositions and inferences made, is in accord with accepted norms of philosophi-
cal analysis. 
I want now to make matters more complex through two summaries of examples
of technical failure drawn from the recent past and the so-called real world. Here
now we encounter participants in the diagnostic task having different responsibili-
ties and interests and, as in the design task, the reconciliation of their different
claims and conjectures requires more then instrumental analysis and object world
work, more than computer modeling and hardware testing, more than analyzing
telemetry data and more, for that matter, than a Jane or a Smith or a Jones who has
but ten coins in his – rather, in their pockets. 
Negotiating quality
My first example is drawn from Diane Bailey’s “Comparison of Manufacturing
Performance of Three Team Structures in Semiconductor Plants”.11 Her aim is to
test the notion that workers, if allowed greater freedom in decision making when
confronted with production problems on the shop floor, will put skills and knowl-
edge to more effective use than will employees going by the book, so to speak. 
In this, she lays out the results of her comparative analysis of the performance
of manufacturing work groups organized in different ways. One group was orga-
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nized in continuous improvement teams (CIT) and in quality control programs
(QC).   She finds that the productivity of the self-directed work teams of etch oper-
ators is poor when compared with the other groups which were organized differ-
ently. This runs counter to her expectations: She had expected the self-directed
work teams to do better. She seeks to explain their relatively poor performance:12
One could argue that time spent by SDWT’s... on resolving quality 
problems would necessarily reduce productivity as measured here by 
the number of wafers produced, but that overall production of good 
chips (from the wafers) would improve by increasing the percentage of 
good chips per wafer. This latter metric is referred to as die yield; 
unfortunately, the complexity of the production process precludes the 
tracking of die yield problems to individual functions, let alone work-
groups.
The complexity is due to the fact that a typical chip had about 16 layers, each
requiring about 4 machine processes resulting in 64 possible processes to consider
as culprits as the cause of any defective chip. The number of machines involved in
these processes increases further the number of potential sources of defective
chips. 
... the problem primarily arose from having many suspects for each par-
ticular type of defect and many more (types of) defects than anyone had 
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36           Chapter  3ever catalogued up to that point. The problem was further complicated 
by not being able to test for most defects after each individual process; 
the entire circuitry needed to be in place before testing could be done.13
One might conjecture that using die yield – the number of good chips per wafer
– rather than wafer count, as a measure of the relative effectiveness of the self-
directed work teams might give a very different measure of the quality of the pro-
duction process. The definition of failure of the production process then becomes
problematic. For the manager of wafer production, the lower percentage of good
wafers, relative to other groups, indicates a substandard process; for quality con-
trol, further along in the production process, a higher die yield might suggest the
contrary. Whether there is a failure of process then becomes a matter of who you
ask.
Even if there is agreement on both counts that the process needs to be
improved, i.e., both measures indicate there is a problem and both parties to the
process agree that corrective action must be taken, there remains the challenge of
determining the cause(s) of the failure and prescribing a fix. This too will involve
more than instrumental reasoning: Negotiation of interests and perspectives will be
required. 
In this, the different competencies and responsibilities of participants in the
fault-finding process point in different directions: The manager of production
looks at the process (as object) and sees one thing – too much scrap in the produc-
tion of the wafers. She worries about organizing and motivating her work force to
do better. The head of Quality Control looks at the process and reads the problem
in another way. He sees a more detailed and complex picture of machines and cir-
cuitry, each able to stray with time. Despite the multiplicity of ways defects might
be engendered, he holds that attacking the problem at this level of detail is the only
way to obtain sure knowledge and be fully justified in advancing a fix. From his
perspective, management appears only to be concerned with surface appearances
and uninterested in getting at the real causes of the group’s poor productivity. The
manager of production, on the other hand, views her colleagues proposals as too
costly and even unnecessary. Like Jane, when confronting the failed truss structure
encased in a housing, she deems it unnecessary, none the less unfeasible, to open
up the black box containing the chip processing and fabricating operations, to look
inside, search for, and determine the “real” - according to Quality Control -
sources of the problem. 
High technology products exhibit this layered complexity. In our diagnostic
activities we would like to get at the root cause of the failure. But at what level of
detail do we stop? And what about the resources required to make this journey?
Limits of time as well as money sooner or later press for closure, for making a
patch - what some would consider a less than satisfying fix - and getting on with
the business. Less pragmatically, we might ask if the idea of a “root cause” in
itself – a single factor which when identified explains all and, if corrected, renders
performance near perfect – is but a fantasy. While a rhetorical construction of such
is always possible, we can question its ontological status, even if the consensus is
broad. My next example illustrates the challenge of finding a single causal factor.       
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This example differs in at least two ways from the previous one: Here there will
be no question about whether failure occurred. Second, the participants in the diag-
nostic process in this case are not all members of the same firm; control and defini-
tion of failure will rest in the hands of different and independent agents.
The failure concerns the performance of the Bridgestone/Firestone Radial ATX
and Wilderness AT tires. As reported by the US National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
Tread separation claims included in the Firestone claims database 
involving the recalled and focus tires have been associated with numer-
ous crashes that have led to 74 deaths and over 350 injuries (as of 
March 2001).14
While I am not going to try to analyze in detail this tragic and costly failure, I
do hope to describe who was involved in the diagnostic and remedial process, lay
out what factors were construed as significant, and sketch how these were negoti-
ated. Participants included, but were not limited to; Firestone Tire; Ford Motor
Company whose Explorer SUV ran on the Firestone tire; the owners, drivers of
this large vehicle; the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and we
might add to the list the hot sun on southern interstate highways. 
Clearly in this case there was a failure. Belief in the connection between tread
separation, primarily on the rear tires, and the crash of the Explorer was amply jus-
tified by the evidence at hand and accumulating. But when we focus on attempts to
determine the cause of failure, we find, as we might expect, different participants
advancing different claims and conjectures about the root cause and what should
be done to set matters right. 
The crashes, according to Firestone, were not due to one over-riding factor, i.e.,
high stress levels leading to tread separation, but derived from a combination of
factors, e.g., low inflation pressure together with an overloaded vehicle. A ques-
tion contested throughout the debate - or negotiations if you prefer - between Fire-
stone and Ford was what tire pressure was required to ensure that the tire
temperature did not rise to the point where tread separation would be likely. Fire-
stone recommended a higher pressure, which meant a harder ride, Ford a lower
pressure. Firestone also concluded from tests that the Explorer vehicle allowable
load levels which were set by Ford, for the tire pressure initially specified for the
Explorer, again by Ford, would approach the limits of the tire’s load carrying
capacity. Tires on average lose about one psi per month so in four months “...the
left rear of an Explorer would be overloaded.” 
Ford of course, held that the root cause lay in Firestone’s marginal design of
the tire, coupled with poor quality control at Firestone’s Decatur plant – a fact the
tire manufacturer allowed though claiming the Decatur tire still met Ford’s specifi-
cations.
Firestone, at one point, claimed that the shoddy design of the Explorer was the
root cause. In a letter to NHSTA, asking the agency to open a safety defect investi-
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a tread separation on a rear tire, they claimed 
...that the crashes (many of which involved rollovers) that occurred in 
Explorers following tread separations of Firestone ATX and Wilder-
ness AT tires were to a large extent due to the design of the Explorer 
rather than a defect in the tires.15
Here, more obviously, we have a diagnostic task which includes different par-
ticipants with different interests, responsibilities, competencies and perspectives.
Here too a task which required object-world work: the engineering analysis of
internal stresses in the ATX and AT tires and whether they exceeded allowable
levels; the experimental measurement of increase in temperature of the tires after
running under load at high speeds and how this depended upon the initial pressure
in the “cold” tire; the dynamic stability of the Ford Explorer under normal operat-
ing conditions and when perturbed by the blow-out of a rear tire. But these studies
were not, in themselves alone, definitive: Negotiation of cause and fixing of
responsibility builds upon object-world knowledge but this knowledge, while nec-
essary, is not sufficient. 
While the matter may have quieted down, only recently we find a news report
of another tire recall not unrelated: Continental Tire North America has recalled
half a million tires installed on Ford’s sport utility vehicles because some of the
tires had lost their tread.15
Consider now, in a skeptical vein, if the Ford Explorer did not exist – a possible
world we must admit. Would the failure have happened? That is, would the occa-
sions when these same tires on other vehicles blew out and caused a crash, even
death of the vehicle occupants, been of sufficient frequency so that a failure would
have been identified? Would the determination of cause play out in the same way?
We might even go further and ask: What if government regulations on gas millage
precluded labeling the Explorer SUV as a light truck. Would there have been a
Ford Explorer? Should we count government inaction, the existence of this loop-
hole, as a contributing cause? Where do we draw the boundary? How far do we go
before claiming all else remains equal (or irrelevant, or non-contributory)?
Conclusion
How do engineers cope with error? I have tried in these stories, all concerned
with technical failure, to shed some light on the nature of error, how it can or can-
not be explained, and what it requires to construct a remedy, “a fix”. 
As engineers, we stand as society’s role model of rational, instrumental think-
ing. We would like to proceed with some assurance that we can identify the true
cause of malfunction in our designs, products and systems and so be certain and
confident in our proposals to set things right. This, from the perspective of the
skeptic, is not possible. Though one may be justified in one’s belief that a fix will
hold for all time, one does not know this will be the case. Of course that does not
mean that one should not strive to uncover the true cause, or causes, of failure,
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it does set a limit on what might be claimed as certain knowledge. And while a
complex system may present more of a challenge, the result holds true for products
of the simplest kind. There is always the possibility of some unthinkable event
happening within some bizarre context - in design, in manufacturing, in use - pro-
voking unanticipated behavior, which may or may not be construed as “failure”. 
This last observation points to a further complexity - the social nature of “fail-
ure”. By that I mean not only that the actions of people, agencies and social insti-
tutions may be factors in failure, but that addressing and setting things right
requires negotiation among different parties to the problem in order to identify,
define, and resolve matters. This, then, makes diagnostics like designing: And just
as a design is under-determined, so too any final construction of failure and its
remedy rests under-determined. 
At the root of this claim lies the possibility that different participants in the
design or the diagnostic process see the world differently and that these differ-
ences matter. While a strictly instrumental picture of technique in the world may
be efficient and effective, according to certain norms and values, it does not neces-
sarily follow that everyone must see, understand, and read that world in the same
way. Allowing this to be the case enables a deeper understanding of the challenge
of engineering practice in all of its forms.
The reader may note that I have said little about “human error”, malpractice or
unethical behavior in my essay. As such, one might conclude that my analysis is
seriously deficient and even evasive, i.e., writing off the search for a root cause as
misguided suggests technical failure is never a matter of individual or corporate
wrong-doing. The observation is correct but the consequent not: Of course engi-
neers can be negligent, cheat, accept kick-backs from a supplier, alter the data, be
oblivious to societal values, color the facts on the witness stand, etc. And so too
corporate directors. My interest is in better understanding ordinary engineering
practice not the pathological, the diseased, the abnormal. Most product and system
failures spring not from ill-intention or evil doing but have their source in the
mundane, everyday ethos of object world work. The unknown and under-deter-
mined nature of what we are about suffices nicely. Here is where I focus – on the
collective enterprise of engineering design, seeking to explain technical failure
when all participants work in accord with the norms and standards of the profes-
sion.   
Another lacuna: Although the topic lies within my field of view, I do not
address the contribution of law and legal processes to the definition of failure. In
many cases the legal process is, in its quest to fix liability, a major ingredient in
the definition and construction of failure. I acknowledge its importance but for me
to do full justice to its role would require engaging a different world. That is a
whole other chapter, if not an entire book. It suffices to say that one should not, in
many cases, take the award of damages of the court as necessarily locating the root
cause of failure.
 What does interest me is the apparent disjunction between the world of law, of
liability, of ethics, of moral judgement and the supposed value-free norms prevail-
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made evident in many ways – the jokes they tell about lawyers, the use of the pas-
sive voice in all technical analysis, the puzzlement expressed when pressed to be
socially responsible – resonates with, and is prerequisite to, their belief in the pos-
sibility of optimum design, of fault-free code, of unlimited technical progress and
perfection. By looking at technical failure and allowing the possibility that it is
oversimplifying, if not impossible, to reduce events down into a set of purely tech-
nical factors and another set of human, social, and/or legal factors we can better
understand both why this chasm seems so deep and what might be done to remedy
the fault.
 If we do not pursue this possibility and shake off our naivete, we are left with
a division of the world into two disconnected domains, (two cultures); the social
on the one hand - where subjectivity, opinion, and values matter - and the techni-
cal/scientific on the other - where objectivity, uniformity, scientific law and cold,
value-free instrumental reasoning matter. Life within the former then depends on
the needs, desires, and interests of peoples; life within the latter becomes banal,
mundane, autonomous, purely instrumental - all object world work at all levels.
This is not the world we live nor work in. We engineers ought to know better.
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4Knowing that and howIn the last chapter, I explored what engineers don’t know. This time I want to
address what they do know. In particular, I am interested in the grounds for their
beliefs and consequently their actions, their decisions, their designs. What is fun-
damental in engineering thought and practice?
First, a caveat: There are many different kinds of engineering practice; many
different object-worlds; different disciplines for sure. Cutting another way, there
are many different kinds of tasks engineers engage - design, diagnostics, research
related to product development, manufacturing, project management, sales engi-
neering, and let us not forget teaching - and engineers work in different industries,
on projects of different scale - in budget, time, materials, market - and we might
even allow for different national styles. I can not cover all of this ground so I will
restrict my attention to work within an engineering object world, one I am most
familiar with, and explore what counts as knowledge, what is fundamental there. I
would hope that what I have to say is pertinent to a variety of such worlds, tasks,
industries and cultures. 
Another prefatory remark: I am a realist. I believe there is a material world
apart from me (and you). But I also suspect that we can never know its true
essences, “...the bare reality itself”.1 We see “...shadows on the wall of our cave”,
“now, through a glass darkly”, but never the “thing in itself”. We do fairly well,
though, constructing general theories framed with mathematical rigor and working
up phenomenological laws linking cause to effect - as well as thinking up cause
and effect - and these suffice, at least for awhile, to explain the workings of ‘bare
reality’. They suffice in that they provide a set of coherent, socially valued and
useful stories - explanations that enable us to make sense of the world around us in
quite general terms and to remake the world to our liking in many particular ways. 
History reveals how such theories and particular explanatory laws have been
artfully conjectured, developed, derived, tested, and put to use. History also shows
that alternatives are possible; our theories and explanations are never unique and,
in one way or another, always a bit off. Whether we are progressing toward the
truth is another question. This makes me a relativist but only to the extent that
allows me to claim that people are different and see the world differently in signif-
icant ways, whether they be contemporaries or ages apart. Consequently, to under-
stand the nature and status of scientific and/or engineering knowledge, one must
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Philosophers of science tend to ignore context; they appear to believe that
knowledge is a matter of beliefs and their justification in terms of propositions and
their logical consequences alone, uncluttered by social norms and values or cul-
tural perspective. This serves them well in the rational reconstruction of scientific
theories, in clarifying assumptions, in testing the coherent meaning of terms, and
exploring completeness and the full reach of a theory but it says little about what it
takes to do science, to build a theory, to shape an experiment to one’s purpose.
In exploring what constitutes engineering knowledge from a philosophical per-
spective, any like attempt to uncouple knowledge, knowing, and know-how from
its contexts of development and use is destined to be incomplete and unsatisfying.
Two reasons for this: Contra science, engineering knowledge is not primarily tex-
tual, i.e., reported to the world in scholarly journals. While engineering faculty
may publish their claims to new knowledge in the journals of their professional
societies, outside the walls of the academy, within the firm, knowledge and know-
how, which sustains participants in the design and development of new products
and systems, are wielded in more varied ways: Internal memos, lab reports, parts
lists, contracts and suppliers quotes have the form of traditional texts but to read
these a knowledge of context is prerequisite. One can not assume, as one can in
reading a physics abstract for example, that one’s audience knows what one needs
to know to grasp the meaning of such ephemeral productions. Drawings and
sketches, bits and pieces of hardware, prototypes and suppliers’ samples carry
knowledge too; they are part of the language of engineering practice. This dispar-
ate collection of texts and things all enter into the reasoning about and thinking
through of new designs.
Second, the kinds of “things” that enter into engineering discussions are a more
varied lot than in science. True, scientific variables - well respected things such as
force, displacement, temperature, time, charge, current, voltage, velocity, mass -
all measurable and fit for rational explanation, play essential roles. But there are
other variables, less well behaved and tamed - things like costs, margins of safety,
legal codes and regulations, customer wants, aesthetics, ways of manufacturing,
maintenance procedures - which enter into the accounts of engineers as they go
about their business of knowing and of designing. While the scientist works within
a single object world where the reduction of phenomenon to a well ordered set of
variables of common measure is possible, indeed is the norm within any particular
field, no such rendering and convenient abstraction is possible at the project level
in engineering design and product development. 
Because of this variety in content and form, to discuss engineering knowledge
in the abstract, as embodied in traditional texts, as propositional and structured
inference, is bound to, if not fail completely, at least neglect much that is impor-
tant and significant in the reasoning of engineers. While the scientific-like theories
engineers call upon display a logical coherence, the ties that bind ideas, concepts,
and principles to the functioning product are not as determinate as one might
expect or designers hope2. Only when joined with a sensitivity to the context of
development and use, the philosophical study of the nature and status of engineer-
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These are not problems of engineering alone but evidence of a more pervasive
misconception about knowledge - that it is an entity in its own right, contained in
books for all to acquire.
Knowledge
There ain’t no such thing.
A prevailing metaphor for “knowledge” suggests it is a material substance: We
gain knowledge, store it away somewhere in our head; we transfer our knowledge
to our students; some students claim that my course is “like taking a drink from a
fire hydrant”. In planning our courses, we decide what material we must cover,
what to leave out, what to keep in. Knowledge is additive: the material of one
course builds on another. We construct or discover new knowledge in our research
and the value of our contribution is measured by, sometimes literally, the number
of our publications. Knowledge can be deep or superficial. We know more now
than before. 
This way of speaking and thinking is mistaken: The metaphor - knowledge as
“stuff” (solid or fluid or gaseous - solid is better than gaseous) leads us astray. I
will continue to use the term, finding it hard to do otherwise, but I will try to speak
of knowing rather than of knowledge, of an activity rather than of stuff, as this bet-
ter fits my vision of its nature. 
My critique is not original: Karl Popper describes as mistaken our “common-
sense theory of knowledge” which sees our mind as “...a bucket which is originally
empty, or more or less so, and into this bucket material enters through our senses...
and accumulates and becomes digested”3. Popper would have us distinguish
between two kinds of knowledge, subjective and objective. The latter “...consists
of the logical content of our theories, conjectures, and guesses... Examples of
objective knowledge are theories published in journals and books and stored in
libraries; discussions of such theories; difficulties or problems pointed out in con-
nection with such theories; and so on”.4   Popper is not alone in finding fault with
the “container metaphor”.5 
I agree with Popper’s critique in the main but find it useful to go one step fur-
ther and make a distinction between information and knowledge. Information I
take to be any representation, any human production which has been endowed by
its authors with a disposition to provoke knowing. Thus, Popper’s “theories pub-
lished in journals and books and stored in libraries” constitute information, not
knowledge in and of themselves alone. A drawing, a sketch, contains information.
A prototypical fabrication of hardware is information - as well as machinery. A
computer program, a differential equation, a list of specifications, a block diagram,
the final product can be seen in some contexts as forms of information. A textbook,
of course, contains information - but not knowledge. 
Information is stuff. It can be conveyed, transferred from one to another, dis-
tributed, reproduced and done so accurately, without loosing a bit. Verbal expres-
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replayed and interpreted (and mis-interpreted) just as other forms of information.
You can add information to a drawing, subtract information by depressing the
delete key. In certain contexts and for certain purposes one can even measure it as
degree of orderliness.
What knowing is provoked by the particular information at hand depends only
in part upon the author’s intention. The author may intend to provoke certain
knowledge, and the information may function to this end, but this is not assured.
Nor can we rule out the possibility that knowing un-thought-of by the author might
be the result. This is why I find Popper’s concept of “objective knowledge” defi-
cient; it implies that what is written in books and journals, none the less voiced
and heard in a discussion, will be “read” in the same way by all. After all, that’s
what objective means. But while the author of texts, sketch, prototype, etc. would
hope readings made would be in line with their purpose, this may not prove the
case. We can ask then, how does the information function? Is it in accord with the
author’s intent? At the same time, we should allow for a creative reading that may
be in line with the intention of the author but extends or embellishes. The author
may even confess that he or she (or they) had never thought of that. Creativity
springs from around the edges of words.
In sum, the same body or stream of information can provoke different readings,
different knowing, by different persons. (Object worlds again). The meaning and
significance of what I say may not be the same as what the person next to you
derives from my words. What one student claims to know after reading from my
textbook will not be the same as what another student learns from the same selec-
tion, though we pretend they all know the same. We go to the movies; you see the
film event as fore-shadowing and know what is going to happen next; I miss this
entirely - though I was not yet asleep. The instructions for assembling the do-it-
yourself product, e.g., a backyard barbecue, may be interpreted one way by one
person, another way by his brother6; both, if successful, know how to do it. Wit-
tgenstein asks me to continue the series, to extrapolate on the basis of the informa-
tion contained in the sequence of numbers, and I go one way, he goes another7.
And Clifford Gertz has convinced me that I must be careful when I wink in a for-
eign land8. 
While intention is essential to the production of information and the provoca-
tion of knowing, the meaning construed may not be as intended, no matter how
much effort the author puts into his production. Of course, this is not always the
case. Because so much of common discourse is conducted in terms of standard,
culturally saturated, forms and expressions, the author need do little work giving
form to intention as information in many standard settings and situations. Searle’s
analysis of speech acts is all about common forms.9 But when the situation is new,
the intention not standard, the ground not covered - as in the design of the new -
then the task of transforming intention into information which provokes the know-
ing one intends becomes real, formidable and non-trivial. Authoring remains no
light task.
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knowing, an event in time requiring action on the part of those who provoke and
those who would come to know. The same information - e.g. text, artifact, draw-
ing, photograph, signal - in two different temporal settings can provoke different
thinking and knowing.   Newton’s axioms provoked certain interpretations in the
wake of their appearance. They neatly provided a way to calculate and understand
the motion of seemingly all heavenly objects. Today they provide the basis for
knowing about all kinds of terrestial as well as celestial phenomena. The concept
of force in the 17th century was understood and used differently than today. So too
the idea of “mass”10. To claim that Newton and his contemporaries “knew” these
concepts the same way as scientists and engineers do today is mistaken11.   Again,
this is not to claim that we can not, do not, have a framework for talking about the
differences in understanding displayed in different historical periods. Our grand
worlds are not incommensurable. Still one might claim that Newton worked within
a different object world - of force, position, velocity, impact, momentum - than
applied mechanicians do today. And while we can always construct some anachro-
nistic comparison from today’s perspective, at the same time we ought to confess
how difficult it is to see things otherwise: One can wonder how truthful to the
author’s intent any historical explanation can be or, what is much the same thing,
whether we can truly re-live the historical essence of Newton’s Newtonian
Mechanics though sufficient information is there for all to see and read. One need
not juxtapose different historical periods in making the point: Two scientists who
are contemporaries may have quite different interpretations of the meaning of a
proposition.
De-coupling information from knowledge, together with the idea that different
persons may know differently after engaging the same information, also enables
me to accommodate those who claim that artifacts convey or contain knowledge.
“Thing knowledge” 12from this perspective is then what one reads out of the mate-
rials at hand. But again, there can be different, superficial, deep, or even erroneous
interpretations by different persons. 
Finally, it naturally follows that any attempt to distinguish engineering knowl-
edge from scientific knowledge must move beyond the comparison of texts and
other forms of information. Only through consideration of what engineers do and
what scientists do can one come to distinguish what engineers know from what sci-
entists know. Much of engineering information has the same appearance, is the
same in this respect, as information available to and relied upon by scientists. But
what engineers know and what scientists know is not revealed there alone. While
we can speak of engineers applying scientific knowledge, it’s best to get our mind
off the stuff and take a look at how and why and when it is applied (but not like
paint). 
Structural Engineering Object World
Engineers come in different kinds; they address different tasks, of different
scale and complexity, have different responsibilities, competencies and interests.
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like managers. Some interact daily and intimately with hardware, others only deal
with objects as fantasies, in software. But all who have an accredited engineering
degree do share one important thing in common - a science-based, university edu-
cation.13 This frames their thinking, their knowing, their doing whatever their
position.   In this section I focus on object-world thought and practice with a par-
ticular discipline, one common to university programs in mechanical, civil, and
aerospace engineering - a particular discipline I am most familiar with, namely
structural mechanics. 
Physical, material structures come in different kinds. There are truss structures
(we saw one in a previous chapter); there are frame structures made out of beam
elements; there are cable structures; plate structures and shell structures. All
these various forms, when subject to external loads, experience internal forces and
stresses; and they deflect and deform. They may vibrate and resonate, quake at
specific frequencies. They also can fracture, flow like a plastic, corrode, crack and
fail due to cyclic loading - what’s known as fatigue. They can absorb energy -
think of the crash worthiness requirements in the design of automobiles. They
expand when heated and this can engender excessive internal stresses if the struc-
ture is over-constrained. 
In designing a structure within a particular context, at least some of these phe-
nomenon must be addressed and an explanation of behavior constructed: If I apply
an end load of a given magnitude to the end of this cantilever beam, will it frac-
ture? Where will it fracture? How much will the end deflect if it does not fail? If I
suspect my design might fail due to fatigue, what tests should I set-up and run to
verify my design? What thickness should I specify for the walls of a soda can to
ensure its integrity both under internal pressure and the firm grasp of a hand when
opened? 
There is a fundamental theory for answering these and similar questions: The
mathematical theory of elasticity. Perhaps I should say “theoretical framework”
rather than “mathematical theory”. There is a mathematical theory of elasticity,
but this suggests that all questions are addressed and all problems solved by rigor-
ous deductive-nomological derivation of specific laws applicable to the particular
phenomenon at hand from this theory. While, in principle, this may be possible,
this way of envisioning matters would be a gross violation of both the historical
origins of particular theories and of how rules and instrumental relationships are
re-construed in practice. 
The full theory of elasticity is taught in schools of engineering, usually at the
upper-class and graduate level but undergraduates see the same concepts and prin-
ciples introduced in their study of particular structural elements and forms, e.g., in
the analysis of the behavior of trusses, cables and beams and frames. The theory is
laid-out in certain canonical texts14. Internal histories have been written15. The
giants upon whose shoulders we stand include not just Newton but Galileo, the
Bernoullis, Leonhard Euler, Lagrange, Laplace, Poisson, Navier, Cauchy, Young,
Stokes, and others. This is hard-core, mathematical-scientific stuff. 
Now while instruction in the schools of engineering does not do justice to the
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all courses in statics and strength of materials, in the behavior of solids and struc-
tures, in engineering mechanics for structures, as well as the theory of elasticity
itself, speak in terms of the same theoretical objects - force, moment, stress, strain,
displacement - and refer everything back to three fundamental requirements; the
equilibrium of forces and moments, compatibility of deformation, and constitutive
laws which relate force to deformation or stress to strain.
In what follows I intend to illustrate the way engineers think and work within
this theoretical framework and put concepts and principles to use in their teaching,
in predicting or diagnosing failure, and in justifying their designs. My purpose is
to explicate the fundamentals of engineers’ ways of knowing, to explore how theo-
retical objects, laws, and claims mix with mathematical representation and method
and with the observed, sometimes measured, behavior of real structures in the
thinking and doing of engineering. I consider an excerpt from an engineering text-
book; a historical tract of importance; and the design and development, building
and use of an instrument. I pay particular attention to the language engineers use
and the narratives they construct - stories intended to provoke knowing, not just by
others, but in a reflective mode, by themselves as well, working alone. I am inter-
ested in exploring how the narrative, within which the “science” is embedded, does
its work. Through these examples we begin to see what is fundamental in their
knowledge claims and how that justifies their designs. We discover too how infor-
mation can be interpreted in different ways, extended, codified and archived. 
An Engineering Textbook
My first example is drawn from a
well respected textbook on our
subject16.   It concerns the derivation of
the necessary conditions for static equi-
librium of a solid body, viewed as an
isolated system of particles. It’s pur-
pose is to relate the fundamental princi-
ples that necessarily must hold for an
isolated body to be in static equilib-
rium, back to a still more fundamental
picture - that of the body as a collection
of particles to each of which we apply
Newton’s laws.
Already my language becomes opaque, coded. The information contained in an
engineering textbook has this mystifying quality: The words look like English -
mathematical expressions notwithstanding - and the figures look simple enough,
but something strange is going on here. Equilibrium, particles, body, Newton -
these are all familiar terms. But the way they are used, their collective impression
is of another world - an abstract, timeless, neat and proper world where static equi-
librium is not only possible but necessary. A world of too simple figures - mini-
F1
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Fig. 4.1 An isolated system of particles showing
external and internal forces. 
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here, only gravity, continuity, equilibrium and a garden of a variety of materials.
In what follows, I italicize passages of textbook type so the reader will know when
we have entered and exited this world.
Our story begins with the picture above17. The dashed line stands for the
boundary of our isolated system of particles. All interactions with the world out-
side of the body are replaced by force vectors (or moment vectors). The force vec-
tors acting on the body due to this isolation are indicated. From here on, we can
forget about the rest of the world18. 
Inside the boundary we see six particles. These entities are featureless in the
sense that they have no color, no particular shape, nor even size, although they
must be sufficiently small. At one time it was thought that their shape determined
how they interact, and so their collective behavior19. But our narrative has no need
of shape, color, nor size - just “smallness”; but even the measure of the latter can
remain unstated. What the particles do have is the property of exerting a force on
their neighboring, like particles. They are centers of force. 
Of course there are more than six particles in a solid body; generally we think
of a continuous body as having an infinity of particles. Each of these is subject to
external forces - e.g., gravity. Some will experience other externally applied
forces; all will be subject to internal forces due to the other particles. These latter,
in accord with Newton, occur in equal and opposite pairs.
This neglect of the infinity of particles is one form of “all other things being
equal”: All the other particles are taken to behave just as these six behave. Indeed,
there is nothing sacred about six; the authors could have shown three, or four, or
more than six. But there is another kind of “all other things being equal” going on
here in the sense that whatever else might be described as properties of solid bod-
ies or their constituents, beyond this sparse description in terms of small particles
and the forces acting between them, is irrelevant to establishing the necessary con-
ditions for the equilibrium20. Of course, what is not relevant encompasses an infin-
ity of properties and things. To describe all that does not matter in the rest of the
world is not feasible The textbook narrative presumes the reader already under-
stands the irrelevance of most of the world; that students already have a sense of
the furniture of this particular object world in engineering mechanics from their
studies in physics and mathematics; they must already understand what kinds of
entities are allowed into this world; they must already speak the rudiments of this
language.
Now for static equilibrium, again in accord with Newton, the sum of all the
forces acting on any particle must vanish so the sum of all the forces shown in the
figure must vanish. But since all of the internal forces occur in equal and opposite
pairs, they sum to zero. So we are left with the result that the vector sum of the
external forces must be zero     
                                   
There is something magical about this process; by introducing and adding zero
F1 F2 ....... Fn+ + + Fj
j
∑ 0= =
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equilibrium which the external forces must satisfy. How can introducing nothing,
give us something? Alternatively, why go to all this trouble? Why not simply posit
the requirement - for equilibrium, the vector sum of the external forces must be
zero - as fundamental and be done with it? One respected critic has argued this
way.21
Continuing, considering the total moment of all the forces about an arbitrary
point yields the result (again because the internal forces self destruct) that the
total moment of all the external forces about an arbitrary point must be zero.
                
Here then are the two requirements for static equilibrium of a rigid body.
                   
The simplicity of these equilibrium equations is to be noted - simplicity in the
sense that there are but two species of entities that enter into them - force and posi-
tion. This simplicity corresponds to the poverty of our picture showing the parti-
cles constituent of the solid body. These mathematical relations go hand-in-hand
with the picture and with the narrative to, all together, constitute the necessary
conditions for the static equilibrium of a rigid body. The equations alone do not
suffice - too ambiguous; what are we talking about? The picture alone does not
suffice - too sparse. Newton’s laws alone do not suffice -too general. But all of
these bits, together with talk about boundaries, external forces, reference posi-
tions, and presumptions about the rest of the world, make a coherent and useful
narrative.
What kind of knowledge is this? Abstract, certainly; universal too. Its use of the
passive voice and dismissal of human agency assures it’s communal acceptance. It
is intended as dogma, as fundamental concepts and principles, that will empower
those who learn the language and enter this world with the right perspective and
with the competence and confidence to analyze, to diagnose, to design any struc-
ture conceivable in its terms. The sense is that if the student learns but these two
requirements for the equilibrium of a solid body, then he or she possesses what is
sufficient as well as necessary for the solution of any problem he or she might con-
front in the engineering mechanics of structures22.
While not all textbooks offer this “derivation” of the two requirements for
static equilibrium, the intentions of other authors is the same: to reveal the power
and general applicability of such a sparse set of concepts and laws. It is reduction
at its finest, yielding an efficient and all encompassing basis for analysis within
the world of mechanics. There is clearly a principle of economy of thought evi-
denced here: We need but faceless particles together with but one fundamental law
to explain all; equilibrium of a solid body is but a consequence of equilibrium of
forces acting on a particle. 
Textbooks are written for teaching purposes, of course. Some have an orienta-
tion toward the “applied”, others more toward “theory”. Textbook styles change
with the times, though theory stands a good chance of holding a steady presence.
r1 F× 1 r2 F× 2 ....... rn F× n+ + + rj F× j
j
∑ 0= =
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present as fundamental, and with good reason: For engineering knowledge is
aimed at doing, at making, at producing the new; its focus is not the past - to which
we now turn. 
A Historical Development in Theory
Not all textbooks include this derivation from first principles. In fact its legiti-
macy can be called into question on several grounds. I have already referred to one
critic’s complaint; I will focus on another related way in which it is a bit off. It’s
not that these two equilibrium requirements are not “true”; every student learns
quickly that they must be accepted as fundamental and applicable if they are to
solve any of the assigned problems in engineering mechanics. It’s that, taking this
vision of interacting particles as a theoretical representation of the behavior of a
solid when it is allowed to deform, can lead you astray. The picture does not work
for a collection of particles that is subject to external forces, subsequently
deforms, and one seeks to determine the displacements of all the particles in the
deformed state.
Navier tried this in 1821. He modeled a deformable, elastic solid in accord with
the picture. He looked at an arbitrary particle - what he called a molecule - and
considered the equilibrium of that particle due to the forces of all the other sur-
rounding particles and the external force it was subject to. So far everything is in
accord with our textbook figure23. 
He then allowed the particles to move relative to one another - the body to
deform. He posited that the force acting on any isolated particle due to another
particle was linearly related to the change in distance between the two. (Navier is
showing good engineering sensibilities here. Try a linear relationship first, see
what that gives you). He did not know what this force law was but posited that its
magnitude depended upon the original distance between the particles as well as the
change in distance between them. In fact, following Laplace, he claimed that it
was only “sensible at insensible distances”. This enabled him to forget the bound-
aries of the solid and replace his summations by infinite integrals which he
claimed gave a finite result. All that remained of this unknown force law in his
final system of equations for the displacement components of the molecule - here
designated by u, v, and w - was a constant, λ. In modern notation, his results take
the form:                         
              
These equations look very much like the equations of equilibrium expressed in
terms of displacement for a linear, elastic, homogeneous, isotropic body appearing
in textbooks on the Theory of Elasticity. There is only one thing wrong and that is
fundamental: There is but one constant, λ, appearing in these equations. Today’s
theory requires two, independent elastic constants. The equations now have the
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 Navier’s work did not avoid critique. A contemporary found fault in the way
he transformed his summations over discrete forces into integrals over the contin-
uum. But addressing this complaint would not introduce another constant (nor was
it a complaint with merit). One might think that the deficiency in Navier’s theory
would have been discovered through experiment. Yet this proved quite improbable
if not impossible. For Navier’s relationship can be obtained from the correct set by
setting λ and µ, the two constants, equal, - an equivalence approximately true for
many common structural materials. While these “correct” equations of force equi-
librium in terms of displacement were established not too long after Navier pre-
sented his memoir to the Institute, controversy over the number of independent,
elastic constants persisted over much of the 19th century.
I am not going to try to rationally reconstruct how and why Navier went wrong,
what that might mean, or how the correct theory subsequently evolved25. What is
worth comment is the relationship of the mathematical, analytical content to the
basic physical principle he employed - that of sensible forces at insensible dis-
tances. The mathematical content is sophisticated, state of the art of the time; the
physical principle seems too simple, too cryptic to lead anywhere. But there was
much there. 
Laplace was the respected author of this notion, a principle he and his proteges
usefully employed in the analysis of a wide range of phenomena. The “correct”
provocation or stimulus would have the reader understand that one need not know
the explicit dependence of the force acting between any two particles upon the dis-
tance between the particles in order to construct a useful analysis. Again, magic:
We seem to posit “nothing” in the sense that you don’t need to get wrapped up in
details about the nature of this internal force, its source, how it varied with dis-
tance, size or shape of the molecule, etc., in order to derive a coherent, logically
consistent and useful explanation of the deformation of an elastic solid subject to
externally applied forces26.
Today’s textbook development of the theory of elasticity, the correct theory for
deformable solids, offers the same generality but presents a quite different picture
of a solid body. This theory, due primarily to Navier’s contemporary Cauchy, sees
an elastic solid as a homogenous continuum. No molecules here - nor particles of
any shape or size whatever. Internal forces are construed, not as forces acting
between particles, but as stress, like pressure, as a force per unit area. For exam-
ple, a tensile stress at a point within a body is defined as the limit of ratio of the
force acting perpendicular to a differential element of area to the area as that area
becomes vanishingly small. You might think that if one focuses on the vanishingly
small one might encounter an atom or two and begin to wonder what happened to
our material world - of molecules, or atoms, or grain boundaries and slip planes.
No matter; we engineers accept this particle-less picture and work with it to our
advantage. It is not only essential to our object-world analyses in the design of
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past, new extensions and interpretations, often motivated by the behavior of new
materials in new configurations and mixtures prompt research within its domain.
While the urge to speak in terms of universals, general concepts and a minimum of
principles is real among engineers, this reflects, not a thirst for scientific truth, but
the need for a sufficiently rich and expressive (and efficient) language to carry on
with the job of predicting the behavior of real structures. 
Here is a significant distinction between the status of theoretical knowing
among scientists and among engineers: Scientists are concerned with the explana-
tion of nature’s phenomena (what’s left of it). Engineers are concerned with under-
standing the built, the engineered world. This entails that engineers can take a
certain detached view of the epistemological status of the theories they think,
design and, build with. Their stance is pragmatic. Verification is a matter of how
well their productions work in accord with their predictions. So if they can deduce
useful relationships about the behavior of structures from a an abstract mathemati-
cal representation of structural elements as continua, that will suffice. They are
perfectly happy with statements like: A beam behaves as if it were a continuum -
made up of molecules, atoms, fundamental particles; they care not. All of this is
context dependent.
A critical reader of my juxtaposition of these two different representations of
the workings of a solid body might object: Our textbook authors are explicit in
stating their model is meant to be of a rigid body - one in which the distances from
any particle to any other does not change when subject to externally applied forces
so I am not justified in applying it to bodies that do not respect this condition. The
point is well made, but overly restrictive. For if we insisted that this criterion
apply to the reading and extension scholars make of the productions of their prede-
cessors, there would be little if any, even normal progress in the sciences, none the
less in engineering. A more legitimate complaint would fault my association of
these two events drawn from two quite distinct contexts - a 20th century American
textbook and a memoire of the French Academy of Sciences, dating from the early
19th century. The former objection accepts the apparent timelessness of engineer-
ing and scientific knowledge: Context, from this perspective is irrelevant. The lat-
ter objection accords context its due and is worth further consideration - but we
leave that for another time. I now turn to a still earlier historical period and con-
sider the construction of knowledge about the behavior of a particular structural
element - the cantilever beam. 
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Scientists and engineers
both claim Galileo as ancestor.
He is best know for his defense
of Copernicanism. I am con-
cerned here with his more down
to earth studies - that which we
find in the Second Day of his
“Dialogues Concerning Two
New Sciences” where he
addresses some truly practical
questions about the breaking of
beams.
The figure shows his cantile-
ver beam. He wants to know
how big the weight at the end
can be before the beam breaks.
(Don’t be distracted by the wall.
You are to assume the wall will
not fail, in fact remains rigid.
ceretus paribus). 
In engineering parlance, he “models” the beam as a lever, an angular lever. I
have added a figure, corrupted his drawing, showing the way I read the informa-
tion provided in the English translation by Henry Crew and Alfonso de Salvio of
his Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences. 
The lever is an idealization, abstract in more ways than one. The lever is a rigid
body; it doesn’t deform; the beam remains straight. It is assumed weightless, at
least at the start. The weight at the end is taken to be concentrated, acting at a point
C.   I have shown the “....resistance to fracture which exists in the thickness of the
prism, i.e., in the attachment of the base BA to its contiguous parts...” as an arrow
directed to the left (the contiguous parts pull back on the end of the prism) and
labeled it R. I have shown a fulcrum, about which the lever can rotate, at b. 
For equilibrium of the lever, the ratio of R toW must be the same as the ratio of
the length bc to one-half the length ab. That is27
                                           
So if you know what force is required to break the prism by pulling it along its
axis, putting it in tension, namely the “absolute resistance” here designated by R,
then this relationship tells you what end-load the same prism, working as a cantile-
ver, can sustain. This is Galileo’s main result translated into today’s proper lan-
guage of engineering mechanics applied to structures.
Galileo then considers how this result changes if the weight of the prism itself
is to be taken into account - in which case half of the prism’s weight is to be added
to the end weight, W, or, we can say that the endload to produce failure will be
reduced by half the weight of the prism. (The prism’s weight, assumed uniformly
R
       Fig. 4.2 Galileo’s Cantilever Beam
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crum). 
He goes on to consider two prisms of different cross-sectional area and claims
“....no one can doubt” that the strength, or absolute resistance is proportional to
the area “...because...the number of fibres binding the parts of the solid together in
one cylinder exceeds that in the other cylinder” as the ratio of the areas. With this
he develops a multitude of particular laws which account for differences in failure
load due to differences in each and every dimension of the beam.
This excerpt serves as an excellent illustration of the use of abstraction in the
idealization of real structures.   Galileo “sees” the beam as a lever; it’s like he has
put on a special pair of eye glasses which enable him to see beyond or through
what any common person would see, i.e., the beam as it is pictured in his text, the
beam which most philosophers would see and credit to external stimuli. 
Galileo also sees a uniform distribution of fibers over the cross-section. In this
lies an implicit recognition that the critical theoretical concept, one essential to
predicting when the beam will fail, is the force per unit area - what Cauchy would
later call stress. If this force per unit area exceeds a certain value, fracture of the
beam at its root will ensue. 
His dialogue is very much engineering in tone and topic. It includes: 
• A mathematical relationship derived within the context of the overarch-
ing framework of theoretical objects and concepts - force, moment arm, 
moment, and the requirements for equilibrium of a rigid body.    
• This embedded in a narrative which lays out what is to be taken as cause 
(the end weight) what as effect (the fracture of the beam at the root) and 
how the cause is related to the effect through the principle of the lever 
and another narrative about how the failure load in tension is propor-
tional to the cross sectional area.
• A statement about failure condition: If you can determine a material’s 
absolute resistance to breaking in what we would call now a tension test, 
then you can predict when cantilever beam of that same material will 
fail.
• An exploration of the breadth of application: The analysis and model 
applies to beams of all kinds “...glass, steel, wood or other breakable 
material”. 
• The devolution of a set of consequences for circular cylinders as well as 
rectangular prisms of different dimensions. How long might the beam be 
before it fails of its own weight? What if the beam is supported at both 
ends rather than at one end alone: He even argues why giants could not 
exist if simply seen as scaled up versions of ordinary persons. In engi-
neering we strive to develop correct scaling laws. 
Despite the insight he displays, his result is incorrect when judged against
today’s theory of the elastic behavior of solids and structures, and engineering
beam theory in particular. While his results are dimensionally correct the factor of
Knowing that and how   571/2 is wrong. This ought not to detract from the importance of his historical “con-
tribution” nor negate the significance of his insight - that the failure of the beam is
due to what we now call an internal bending moment - all else being equal, e.g, the
fastening of the beam to the wall at its root is secure.   His analysis remains correct
and useful in scaling up a beam whose fracture load you already know. More to our
purposes here, Galileo’s strategies for coming to know when a beam might fracture
are akin to those adopted by today’s engineers concerned with the behavior of
structures.
Measuring lift to drag ratio.
My next, and final example is more modern. It concerns apparatus to measure
the forces acting on an airfoil, mounted in a wind tunnel. Our question is again,
what is fundamental, what must one know and know-how in order to understand
why and how this functions - so that one might design, build and successfully
employ the device. 
In the photograph, the vertical black bar is in fact the airfoil whose effective-
ness we wish to measure. It is rigidly attached to a horizontal member, which in
turn is attached at its ends to two brackets. The brackets are free to rotate about
vertical axes. These axes are supported by the two posts of greater diameter.
Another member connects the two brackets at their ends away from the test speci-
men.
 A schematic drawing shows better how the members are connected and the
Fig 4.3 A wind tunnel “drift” balance28
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The view is from above, looking down onto the mechanism. At the top of the
figure we see the cross-section of the airfoil test specimen. (The airfoil extends in
and out of the plane of the paper). To the right is shown an enlarged view of the
member D and includes a picture of the (internal) forces acting at the point where
D is pinned to the member A. 
Air flows at some velocity from right to left. As it flows over and around the
airfoil, the specimen experiences a force which can be decomposed into two com-
ponents - a Lift force perpendicular to the airstream and a Drag force in the direc-
tion of the airstream. 
The test specimen is rigidly attached to the top member A of the mechanism.
The four circles at the corners are pins, made as frictionless as possible so that the
parallel bar motion is not restrained in any way. The dark circles at P and Q are the
thin cylindrical, supporting shafts, the axes about which the two brackets, labeled
C and D here, are free to rotate. These, in turn, are fixed to a base at the floor of
the wind tunnel. A pointer is fixed to member D - it always remains perpendicular
to member D.
In the presence of an airflow of a particular velocity the mechanism will rotate
counterclockwise as shown until equilibrium is established. The device will mea-
sure directly the ratio of the Drag component to the Lift component. In fact, it can
be shown that the ratio of the Lift force to Drag force is a relatively simple func-
tion of the angle, θ, namely 
                                                   
We can deduce this relationship from the requirements of static equilibrium
applied to the system, here modeled not as a continuum but as a system composed
of four rigid links. In contrast to Galileo’s analysis of the cantilever beam where I
drew one idealization, a number of idealizations, one for each of the four members
of the mechanism must now be constructed. For example, an idealization of the top
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Fig  4.4  The wind tunnel “drift” balance - Top view.
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In this, we presume that the pins at C and D, as frictionless, can not transmit
any torque. Our task is to determine the “internal force components” Cx, Cy, Dx,
Dy, in terms of the Lift and Drag forces and the distance measures, a and b. Equi-
librium requirements for this member yields three equations relating these
unknown components to the Lift and Drag force components. But since there are
four “unknown” components, more is required: The more is supplied by making
idealizations of the other three members. 
As this is not meant to be a mechanics textbook, I spare you the details, and
simply announce that this accounting procedure eventually provides a sufficient
number of equations to yield the sought after result, namely that the tangent of the
angle theta is equal to the ratio of the Drag force to the Lift force. Curiously, we
find though that one can not obtain a sufficient number of equations to solve for
internal force acting in member B. Yet the relationship between the lift to drag
ratio and the tangent of the angle does “fall out” of the analysis.
In this example, as in those before, we can explicate knowledge, engineering
knowledge, with respect to two different contexts: One, the object-world of con-
temporary engineering mechanics (and aerodynamics). Two, the historical, more
worldly context of the development and first use of the device. 
Our report so far has focused on what Ryle would term knowledge as knowing
that30; knowing as abstract ideas, timeless concepts and relationships expressed in
mathematical, symbolic form and as analysis of function embedded in a narrative
where the passive voice prevails; e.g., “In fact, it can be shown that...”   “...We
know that... if the member AB is to be in equilibrium - not move - then the result-
ant force and resultant torque on the member, isolated from the rest of the world
must vanish - this in accord with the two equations “derived” from Newton’s laws
as in our textbook....” We know too that the equilibrium requirements are neces-
sary and may be sufficient to justify the proposition: the ratio of the drag force to
the lift force is given by the tangent of the angle theta. That they may be insuffi-
cient must be allowed as the structure may be overconstrained.
There is little in our report about knowing in the sense of Ryle’s knowing how -
as in practice and doing and in the manipulation and shaping of hardware and con-
structing explanations of a more worldly sort about function. While the context for
knowing that stands apart from the ordinary world - it’s a place of frictionless pins,
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straight lines, truly dimensionless points and appears timeless, out of time, out of
history - the context of knowing how is a different sort of place. In this case it’s the
world of the Wright Brothers and the first decade of the 20th century. Here the
world appears more familiar - an ordinary world of bicycle spokes and hacksaw
blades, of imperfect welds and pulsating air currents, and hopefully negligible
deviations from straight and true. 
We turn now to the historical context of development and first use of the instru-
ment.31 Within this context we would like to know how the Wrights did what they
did - engineer an ingenious device for measuring the ratio of the forces of lift and
drag. How did they proceed? What did they know how to do? What must they have
known? How did they imagine the device? What was source of their ideas? What
justified their beliefs and actions; their trials, their designs? 
Here now we move outside the confines of our neat and tidy object-world of
up-to-date engineering mechanics. In fact, if we truly wish to recreate the past, it’s
best if we unlearn some engineering mechanics - if that is at all possible. We must
strive to distance ourselves from ourselves, i.e., from the way we read and under-
stand the device. For what we seek to understand is how the authors’ imagined and
constructed the instrument and in our quest we should not presume that they spoke
the modern language of engineering mechanics as we do today, or at least not in
the same way we do today. The challenge of writing justified and true histories is
real; historians worry and write about what’s required. 
Joseph Agassi, for example, set two conditions on how the history of science,
and by implication, the history of technology, should be written. 
The first maxim of enlightened or broad-minded historiography should 
be this: any interesting or stimulating story is good, and should count 
as history if it fulfils two conditions: (a) it does not often violate fac-
tual information easily accessible to its author, and (b) it does not 
present historical conjectures as if they were pieces of factual 
evidence32.
These strictures are meant to provoke more than enlighten. Agassi is saying
that good history is not just a record of historical facts but a good story. Even
apparent and easily accessible facts can be violated, ignored, twisted around if the
historian judges the case otherwise. Conjecture is essential too, but be on guard:
One must not mix historical fact with the historian’s constructions. Even so,
Agassi’s rules grant the historian considerable freedom to play with the facts in
their reconstructions.
While Agassi’s “positive views” - he calls them that - lay out what the historian
should not do, Collingwood is more explicit in describing what is needed in order
to make an interesting and stimulating story: Interpolation, as well as critical
assessment of the facts and source materials, is necessary. One must use one’s
imagination in fleshing out the past. But the imagination is to be employed in ways
“...not ornamental but structural. Without it the historian would have no narrative
to adorn.”
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as Kant has shown, we could never perceive the world around us, is 
indispensable in the same way to history: it is this which, operating not 
capriciously as fancy but in its a priori form, does the entire work of 
historical construction.33
The sense one has here is that of necessity, not of possibilities. Just as through
induction, the scientists develops a coherent theory that can be put to the test, the
historian must employ his inductive powers imaginatively to fashion his story then
confirm his construct through additional facts and others’ stories. Imaginative re-
enactment of the past and the past thinking of history’s agents is Collingwood’s
way of doing history. The proper task of the historian is to penetrate “... to the
thought of the agents whose acts they are studying.” 
In all of this, both Agassi and Collingwood would agree that our reconstruc-
tions of past thought and deed, should be in accord with the standards, beliefs and
norms of the historical period we study. There is no contradiction here, only the
challenge of keeping historian’s conjecture apart from historical fact. A historian’s
responsibility is to re-enact using only the props and stagings of the past. We must
in this continually struggle, in Agassi’s words, to avoid “being wise after the
event”. He points to Koestler’s recommendation that when approaching the past
“...we see ourselves as children” - which Agassi, however, sees as insufficient.
Our task then is reconstruction: We seek to lay out a coherent, rational
sequence of ideas and relationships in a story that explains how the Wright Broth-
ers did what they did. We rely, in this, on a coherent, rational theoretical model of
how the instrument must, should, would work. The latter form of representation
can be made watertight; but the former not. That is, the rigor of object-world the-
ory should not be taken to justify full belief in the historical narrative I construct.
Just as the rational, logical, efficient workings of a finished product can lead one
astray in attempting to reconstruct the design process, so too, an equilibrium anal-
ysis of this historical artifact should not be equated to how it came to be. 
We attend to how the Wright Brothers proceeded, focusing on the apparatus
they came to know and use so effectively, drawing upon original source materials,
fortunately published in book form.34 Our interest is in the knowledge they
employed in their fashioning and reasoning about the “drift” balance. While my
subject is object-world knowledge, my telling is not in the passive voice, disinter-
ested, value-free, written around some mathematical, symbolic expressions which
evaluate to the same result wherever one might be in space or time, but rather a
narrative true to the context of the times which attempts to say how they did what
they did. However, although the Wright Brother’s accomplishment is worthy of
much praise, I will not say much about the weather (e.g., “On a wind swept dune,
one bright morning in Kitty Hawk...” etc.) There are limits to what is socially rele-
vant to object world work. My history is intended to be a history of ideas, of engi-
neering, object-world knowledge and knowing.
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Chanute dated September 26, 1901 in which the
author describes an experiment designed to verify the
data, reported by Otto Lilienthal, a German predeces-
sor who attempted flight (and who died in a crash of
one of his gliders), describing the lift that one might
obtain from an appropriately curved and inclined
wing surface.
In Wilbur’s letter, we find a simple figure, a hand
sketch, included as an essential part of his communi-
cation:
I am arranging to make a positive test of the correctness of the 
Lileinthal coefficients at from 4o -7o in the following manner. I will 
mount a Lillienthal curve of 1 sq. ft. and a flat plane of  .66 sq. ft. on a 
bicycle wheel in the position shown. The view is from above. The dis-
tance from the centers of pressure to center of wheel will be the same 
for both curve and plane. According to Lilienthal tables the 1 sq. ft 
curve at 5o will just about balance the 66 sq. ft. plane at 90o. If I find 
that it really does so no question will remain in my mind that these 
tables are correct. If the curve fails to balance the plane I will cut down 
the size of the plane till they do balance. I hope to make the test on the 
first suitable day35.
A week later, Wilbur reports the results, again in a
letter to Chanute. Another new figure accompanies
his report.
They found that Lilienthal’s predicted lift would not
balance the plane. To figure out why this was the
case, they experimented with the airfoil’s orienta-
tion until they did achieve a balance of the two.
(Though they said they would cut down on the area
of the plane, it evidently was easier to alter the
angle of incidence of the curved surface). They
found that they could balance the flat plate but only
by increasing the angle of attack (to 18o). 
If we stop here and ask what the Wright’s need to
know, what they knew (both that and how), they
clearly know the concept of equilibrium of torque and how to take advantage of it.
Like Galileo, they are balancing an angular lever. This is the underlying form, the
object-world principle they apply (but not like paint). And it is this concept which
threads through all of their subsequent measurement work and the design of their
instruments.
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plar, a common, established case - that of the force on a flat plate set perpendicular
to the direction of the wind. Their measurements, up until the last instance using
the drift balance, were all made relative to the force acting on the plate. Soon
enough, however, they were to question what was known about the absolute value
of the force on the flat plate placed in an airstream, knowledge embodied in a con-
stant labeled Smeaton’s coefficient. 
 At first, they had tried setting out their bicycle wheel in some fixed position
relative to ground in a “natural wind” but this proved unworkable.36 This did not
give satisfactory results. In the second letter they report how they had recourse to
mounting their apparatus over the front wheel of a bicycle to assure themselves of
a more regular and sustained air flow; With this new mobile arrangement, they
rode off “...from 12 miles per hour” to ensure a steady airflow - as steady as possi-
ble at any rate. To null out the effect of any natural, arbitrarily directed wind, they
purposely rode 
...at right angles to the wind so that the natural wind was first on one 
side and then the other as the direction of the course was reversed. We 
found the difference was only two degrees37.
Their experimental technique shows that they knew how to control for the
effect of asymmetries in the air flow, that is, they could correct for this! Note how,
with the apparatus mounted on the moving bicycle, their method would work best
the lower the natural wind.
One thing they do not report is the changes they made in the position of the two
test surfaces on the horizontal wheel relative to the source of the airstream: Com-
paring the two figures we see that in the proposed experiment, the airfoil is
upstream of the axis of the wheel. In the report, it is mounted downstream. The
first configuration would be unstable38. With the airfoil mounted downstream, the
system is stable. 
Why they do not explain the difference in the two figures is curious. Perhaps it
reflects a characteristic of engineering thinking - namely to report only that which
is the case now and true, not precedents that led you astray. Here in these historical
sources we get a whiff of the engineer’s discounting of history. Here too we see
how, with remark made only of the proper function of a device, the possibility of
instability remains an unknown to any new user. If the apparatus has the form
shown in the second figure, stability is assured - “all other things being equal”.     
Another anomaly piqued their curiosity but one this time less easy to accommo-
date. They came to mistrust the constant coefficient attributed to Smeaton which
appeared in the formula for the force on a flat plate. While their experiment
showed what angle of attack was required to balance the plate, and hence gave the
coefficient of lift as the ratio of the force on the airfoil to the force on the plate, if
they took Smeaton’s coefficient and calculated the absolute lift force on the plate,
then, knowing the ratio from their experiments, calculated the lift force acting on
the airfoil, they were surprised by how big the latter was. Though not part of the
original experiment, this result led them dig deep where they had trusted before. 
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new experiments designed to compare the
lift on a flat plate with the lift on a curved
surface both inclined at the same angle to
the air flow. Their words (including the
figure) follow.
In a square trough which served to keep the current straight, a wind 
vane mounted on an axis c was placed. The blades of the vane consisted 
of a plane 1” X 3.25” inclined to one side of the center and a curve 
1”X3.25” inclined to the other side an equal amount. When exposed to 
the wind the vane took up a position to one side of the line of the wind 
direction thus showing that the curve required a less angle of incidence 
than the plane39.
Again, the strategy is to explore what happens in the vicinity of an equilibrium
state. If the force on the plane were the same as the (lift) force on the curve, the
vane would not have moved aside in the air flow - the torque about the axis due to
the lift acting on the plane would equal the torque about the axis due to the lift act-
ing on the curved surface. If the device rotated, the surfaces moved to one side, the
device would come to equilibrium when the torque due to the force on the plate
balanced that due to the force on the curved surface. 
A further manipulation of the apparatus, altering the angle of incident of one
relative to the other until no angular deflection was observed, provided a basis for
further comparison of their results with what others had published. “...I am now
absolutely certain that Lilienthal’s table is very seriously in error, but that the
error is not so great as I had previously estimated...” 40
Note again how the Wrights control for any asymmetry in the airflow “, errors
which might otherwise result from variations in the force or direction of the wind
at different places...” by running each test twice - the second time with the vanes
flipped over so that the curved surface was positioned at the top of the trough and
the plane at the bottom half. (The figure shows the original orientation). In the sec-
ond instance, the vane would rotate opposite to that of the first instance so once
again, averaging the two rotational deflections gave an unbiased measure of the
advantage of the curved section over the plane section at the particular angle of
incidence of the set up. 
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sentation. Clearly, they are controlling for asymmetry, but
what are they measuring?
The arrow shows the direction of the wind. The dotted lines
show the orientation of the apparatus with the curved surface
oriented apparently at a negative angle of attack. (Lift, they
knew, was still possible in this case). The mirror image, solid
lines indicate that the apparatus was turned upside down in an
attempt to control for an air flow which was not truly in the
direction indicated by the arrow. Wilbur Wright explains fur-
ther their purpose: (In this, P90 designates the force perpendic-
ular to the plate, i.e., the “normal force”).
The new apparatus is almost as simple in construction as the vane 
already used and the values given are lifts in percentages of P90 without 
extended calculations. I think that with it a complete table from 0o to 
30o can be made in thirty minutes, and that the results will be true 
within one percent. Errors due to variations in the position of the center 
of pressure are entirely eliminated. The same apparatus will also indi-
cate the line to which the pressure is normal, so that the advantage of 
one surface over another in ratio of lift to drift can be obtained, and the 
truth of Lilienthal’s tangential determined. We hope to have the appara-
tus done within a week41. 
It appears that they are balancing the torque on a flat plate oriented normal or
perpendicular to the flow with the torque due to the lift of a curved surface. But
why the two arms extending out from the vertical axis of rotation? Extrapolating
back from their subsequent work, I conjecture a linkage meant to allow the curved
surface and the flat plate to move without rotation of either surface relative to the
wind. They had noted that “...an almost infinitesimal error is introduced by the fact
that the direction of the vane is inclined from one to two degrees to the direction of
the wind, first on one side and then on the other as the vane is turned over...”42
They reported how their new design enabled them to avoid the effect of shift in the
center of pressure - and, indeed, an analysis of their mechanism in accord with the
requirements of static equilibrium shows this to be the case: The angular displace-
ment of the mechanism is independent of the location of the center of pressure. 
But how did this device work? They claim that they will not only obtain the “...
lifts in percentages of P90 without extended calculations...” but will also be able to
deduce “...the line to which the pressure is normal...” An analysis, done in the
same spirit as the object-world analysis of the drift balance with which we started
this section, shows that measuring the angle of deflection gives the ratio of the Lift
force to the sum of the Drag force and the Normal force, the P90, on the flat plate.
What the Wright’s said they would obtain is the ratio of the Lift alone to the nor-
mal force. So something more must have been done. 
I conjecture that they made two measurements, one with a plate sized to give a
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50% the area of the first. This would give two states in which the Drag force and
Lift force did not change but the value of P90, the normal force, would. These two
relationships could then be used to solve for the ratios of L/P90 and D/P90. 
This is a transitional apparatus: it is a design, yet to be realized, then re-shaped,
re-thought, and re-used until the measurements they obtained satisfied their expec-
tations. 
A letter of October 16 shows the next edition; this time decipherable: It is very
close to the one in which they had full trust.43
On the vertical axels cc’ are fastened the horizontal arms x and x’ 
which bear a crosspiece a on which a normal plane is mounted. The 
horizontal arms y and y’ are equal in length to x and x’ and are 
mounted on friction sleeves which fit the axles c & c’. They bear the 
crosspiece on which the surface to be tested is mounted. This method 
of mounting the surface preserves its exact angle of incidence regard-
less of the angular position of arms y and y’, and also renders it indif-
ferent where the center of pressure is located. In use, the surface is 
mounted on the cross arm at any desired angle and the wind turned on. 
The “lift” moves arms yy’ to the right and the arms xx’ which bear the 
normal plane to the left. The arms which have a friction mounting on 
the axels cc’ are moved back to zero and readjusted till they remain 
there. The angle of the arms xx’ is indicated by the stationary protrac-
tor. The sine of the angle zcs is the lift of the surface, for angle at 
which it is set, in percent of P90.
A static analysis of the apparatus shows indeed that i) the sine of the angle indi-
cated is equal to the ratio of the lift force to the normal force on the normal plane
ii) the angle of incidence of the curved surface relative to the wind is independent
of the orientation of the arms y and y’ and iii) the result is independent of the loca-
tion of the center of pressure. This last claim is counter-intuitive in that one might
think that as the lift force vector moved out away from the axes of rotation, the
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Note too that, at this point they have done away with flipping the device over in
order to account for changes in air speed and direction with location. Now they
rely upon maintaining a unidirectional airflow by adopting an apparatus used by a
Prof. Marey to (straighten) the flow and they enclosed all within a box with a glass
cover - no longer needing to reach inside to draw on the bottom of the box, since
the angular displacement would be reflected in the rotation of a pointer. 
The final, archived representation of their instrument shows still further varia-
tions on the theme44.
The two parallel links now are both located downstream of the airflow: This
would diminish the effects of the curved surface - located upstream in the previous
arrangement - upon the air flow impinging on and around the normal plane. The
authors report in the text of the accompanying letter that they break up the normal
plane into several flat surfaces of the same total area. 
This last representation contains more information; it borders on what one
might include in a patent application. It shows the apparatus in the before and after
state - before adjusting the link carrying the curved surface to null out the effect of
the drag force. It shows more details about the rest of the world; the scale, the ref-
erence, the supports. And it shows a diagram of the relative magnitude of the force
component which acts on the normal plane and the lift force acting on the airfoil.
(The dotted lines 2-3, 2-4 and 3-4).
Their drift measuring instrument is still another, and their final variation on this
theme. But I stop my reconstruction here, not solely because of my felt need to
move on but because the historical facts upon which any extended reconstruction
would draw upon would have to include attention to the contribution of a contem-
porary, Spratt45.
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trustworthy data connecting Lift and Drag to the angle of incidence of variously
curved wing shapes. This information builds upon that originally produced by Lil-
ienthal. It constitutes knowledge, but only when retrieved and used to provoke
knowing anew (As in my reconstruction, in this immediate context, knowing about
engineering knowledge). 
Some scholars describe how, at first, the Wright Brothers complained sorely
about Lilienthal’s lift data, claiming it was seriously in error but then, once they
had adopted a more appropriate value for “Smeaton’s coefficient”, discovered that
Lilienthal’s results were not too different from their own. This suggests to readers
that if the Wrights had read Lilienthal correctly and had paid better attention to
what others had used as Smeaton’s number, they would have not had to go to all
the trouble of conducting their own wind tunnel experiments. This would be a seri-
ous misreading of history, a mistake. Again it is important to distinguish between
information and knowledge, or rather between information and knowing, both
knowing how and that. By doing their own tests and working through the theory
which governed the behavior of their instruments, in mind and in hand, they appro-
priated the relevant “information”, made it their own and then some. Their produc-
tion of this data provoked knowing about Lift, about Drag, about better airfoil
designs, about the effective use of wind tunnels and the fundamental principles
governing static equilibrium of rigid bodies.
All of this must be viewed within the context of the times. It is a mistake to
take this data as we understand it today. Indeed, the way the Wright’s themselves
described it dis-allows so facile a reading. What is Lift? In what direction does it
act? At one place they say it is perpendicular to the wind direction. In flight, this
was not the same as the direction of the “natural wind”. Their flight vehicles were
glider’s (and soaring birds) first, only powered airplanes second. There weren’t
any of the latter at the time. Yet, in the figure, taken from a letter to Chanute dated
5 January, 1902, Lift is shown perpendicular to the horizontal46. 
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doing experiments to measure the forces acting on variously shaped airfoils as a
function of angle of incidence but are creating and constructing the language of
flight - of lift, of drag, drift, chord, angle of attack - ab initio.     
Throughout their efforts to build these instruments, we see them mix knowing
that and knowing how - which suggests any attempt to disentangle Ryle’s two
forms, or to claim one is prior to another, would prove fruitless.   The Wrights read
texts - Lilienthal, Spratt, Chanute - and this provoked their critique. They read
their machinery, responded to it as if they were in dialogue. They embedded their
knowing (that and how) in their apparatus. This joining of craft know-how and sci-
entific, abstract knowing together with this continual reconstruction of idea and
artifact is characteristic of all thorough, modern, object-world development work.
It is both challenge and reward in itself alone. We are not aware of the phenome-
non because few engineers today document their work the way the Wright Brothers
did, provoked by correspondence with a sympathetic and supportive flight enthusi-
ast.
Before leaving this example, we critique the Nasa web page. Here the author’s
analysis appears rational and rigorous. If we accept his idealization of member D,
shown in figure 4.4, his subsequent analysis does lead to the desired relationship
between lift to drag ratio and the angle theta. The problem is that this idealization
is incorrect. 
We see this from my idealization of the top member: If, in figure 4.5, what I
have called Dx and Dy are set equal to the drag and lift forces respectively as his
enlargement of member D shows, then Cx and Cy must be zero for the requirement
of force equilibrium of this top member to be satisfied. But then there is no way
that for an arbitrary theta this member will be in an equilibrium state. For then we
see that the force components Lift and Drag acting on the airfoil together with Dx
and Dy, will, in general, conspire to produce a resultant torque on the top member;
so moment equilibrium is not satisfied. Hence the equilibrium requirements are not
satisfied. Our Nasa author’s analysis is defective. Yet his result is correct! Only
his initial representation, his isolation of the member D is in error. 
In fact, this way of representing has a historical trace, starting with the Wright
Brothers themselves. They show, in the figure included in the letter to Chanute
dated Jan. 19, 1902, a schematic representation of forces very similar to NASA’s
picture and in the text of the letter explain: 
The lift on the surface S will swing the arms....only the lift exercises a 
twisting effect on the axles AA. The lift of the surface S is thus bal-
anced against the normal pressure on the resistance surfaces RRRR. 
The dotted lines 2-3, 2-4, 3-4, show the resolution of forces.  ...while 2-
3 is the lift of the surface S as transmitted through K, I, B, A, H...47
Do we say, then, that the Wright Brother’s analysis was in error? Or are we
misreading their figure? After all, they don’t present their figure as an isolated
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directions of the lift force and the normal force on the plate. If their analysis was
truly in error, if we want to claim that they didn’t really have a full grasp of the
concepts and principles of mechanics, then how did they obtain the (correct) result
that the device would be insensitive to the location of the center of pressure? Here
I run out of steam in my attempt, pace Collingwood, to replicate the Wright broth-
ers knowing.
Reflections
While this last story is meant as history, like our recounting of bits of the work
of our more respectable scientific persons, it too is a story of object-world work.
And although the Wright’s never read Navier’s memoire - and Galileo never rode a
bicycle as far as we know - the brothers are working within an object world which,
at some fundamental level, is the same as the worlds of Galileo, Navier, and the
authors of our modern engineering text; the world of requirements for static equi-
librium; of force and torque, moment arms and resultants.48
 These authors from these different historical contexts all speak the same lan-
guage in this respect, but there are significant differences. The world of the
Wrights appears as crude and awkward relative to our contemporary understanding
of the application of the requirements for static equilibrium. Like primitive Amer-
ican folk art, the Wright’s picture lacks depth. Still their vision is true to the needs
of their task; after all, it worked as a basis for the design of their instruments. The
world of Galileo has some of this same earthly flavor but there is a whole other
purpose to Galileo’s dialogue. It’s not so much about how to build cantilever
beams as it is about how natural philosophers might come to understand and
explain, we would say scientifically, the workings of the most mundane phenom-
ena. Navier’s purpose too is theoretical as much as practical.
 A comparison of the graphics of the three authors, and my elaborations (distor-
tions) is useful: Galileo’s beam as lever stays close to the physical object - by
showing the supporting wall in such disarray he means perhaps to emphasize that
we are not to see the wall as structure altogether. Only the letters intrude into our
landscape. At the other extreme to Galileo is the figure from the today’s engineer-
ing textbook. Here is total abstraction and generality; a specific instance of which
could be taken as the same physical object as Galileo’s cantilever but that is but
scratching the surface. The Wright Brothers’ sketches are intermediary: They sug-
gest the physical apparatus but are just as concerned with the physical principles
and concepts of force and moment, are just as much a display of these variables
and their relationship, as are the texts of Navier and Galileo. Their sketches are
essential to their work, serving both as a template for the construction of each
device and to explain to others how their designs function. 
Science provides a theoretical framework essential to object world work. But a
distinction should be made between different kinds of scientific representations,
and so different forms of information, which engineers draw upon in their work, in
the writing of their textbooks, and in their designing. Cartwright makes the dis-
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cable to the phenomena within a domain and phenomenological explanations
which explain how cause and effect relate in particular phenomena49. Both are evi-
dent in this chapter. Navier’s molecular force theory and Cauchy’s continuum the-
ory for the elastic behavior of a solid are instances of the former, of mathematical
theories meant to be universally applicable. Galileo’s analysis of the phenomenon
of the fracture of a beam and the Wright brother’s analyses of their instrument are
instances of the latter. Contemporary textbooks in engineering mechanics of struc-
tures will include both forms of representation - presenting general mathematical
theory and definition of concepts together with separate sections devoted to the
explanation of the behavior of particular structural elements and systems - trusses,
cables, beams and frames. 
The effort made to bridge the general and the particular varies from one author
to another, and often appears forced and inconsequential. But what is fundamental
is not the integrity or completeness of the derivation of the particulars from the
universal but that the students come to know the meaning of the conceptual entities
and physical principles which enter into both forms of explanation. “To know the
meaning” means to have some sense of the range of phenomena which might be so
explained and how one constructs an explanation, develops ones own narrative and
mathematical analyses when confronted with new phenomena, a new structural
form, a new design. To know the meaning means to speak the language, to join the
game, to know the rules and how and when they apply. 
This orientation toward the pragmatic explains the openness of engineers to
entertain and put to use different stories about, what some would claim, are closely
related phenomena. Engineers are not, for the most part, so much interested in the
development of unifying theories which might reconcile different ways of model-
ing one and the same structure in different contexts. There are those who are
indeed interested in this; those who work at the development of general methods
for the analysis of structures as in Finite Element Methods, but engineers in the
main, out in the big world, make use of existing theory and methods in the expla-
nation of how their alternative designs will behave in particular settings. 
In this, they will generally make use of apparatus and prototypical hardware to
verify the results of their analyses. The Wright Brothers development of instru-
ments to measure the performance of airfoils of their design is an example. In
working with prototypical hardware, the thinking through of how to make and
remake it and the interpreting how it behaves is again done in terms of the same
conceptual apparatus as is essential to reading the mathematical theory of elastic-
ity or the engineering beam theory of Galileo. Prototypical hardware as well as
general concepts, mathematical theory, equilibrium principles are all ingredients
of the proper language of structural engineering. 
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5Learning EngineeringThe past decade has seen a surge of significant activity aimed at the renovation
of engineering education. In this chapter I review some of the changes proposed,
attempted and implemented, focusing on developments in the United States. I
intend to analyze these developments in broad terms, testing to see if a critical,
philosophical perspective can help us better understand both the fundamental
notions motivating and framing change and the likelihood that the proposals for
renovation might work – and if not, what new ways of thinking about “the prob-
lem” might do better. I am particularly interested in how certain deficiencies and
lacunae in the way engineers see the educational process stand in the way of
needed reform. First an overview, a bird’s eye-view of the traditional system.
Engineering education in the US is the business of universities in the main. The
major state universities have colleges or schools of engineering. Other private
institutions also have strong engineering programs - MIT, Cal Tech, Carnegie Mel-
lon, Cornell, Rose-Hulman, Harvey-Mudd, Lehigh, Dartmouth. Not all institutions
offering engineering programs carry on in the same way or are of the same scale;
for example, not all qualify as research universities, though most aspire to be rec-
ognized as such. 
Undergraduate degree programs across this range of institutions have certain
common characteristics. At MIT, as at most universities and schools of engineer-
ing, the curriculum requires a thorough grounding in the basic sciences and mathe-
matics during the first year or two, several courses in the engineering sciences
relevant to the student’s chosen discipline, one or several laboratory experiences,
more specialized advanced courses in a subdiscipline, then a capstone design
course, thesis, or some type of project work in the fourth and final year. The stu-
dents must also spend a significant portion of their time in the Humanities, Arts
and Social Sciences. Some programs deviate in significant ways from the norm,
but in the main, from a bird’s eye-view, this is what one sees. 
Students are mostly male; but recent government funded programs and univer-
sity leadership have had some success in attracting more women and minorities
into the engineering profession. Our youth enter university at the age of 17 or 18,
and are expected to complete a degree program within four or five years. There are
part-time students, mature students, but the norm is as I have reported it. 
One often neglected student characteristic in planning new curricula is what
students intend to do upon leaving the academy. Faculty generally assume that
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management and postgraduate study in engineering as well as work within an engi-
neering firm. While the university may have orientation programs and offer advice
to those who seek to do otherwise, e.g., to go on to medical school, to law school,
or even to prepare for secondary school teaching, the core curricula are defined by
departments, of Mechanical Engineering, Civil Engineering, Chemical Engineer-
ing, Electrical Engineering...etc. and are set by faculty in accord with the expecta-
tion that the student will become one of them.
Faculty are predominately male; diversification here has proven more difficult,
despite the inducements offered through government programs and the implemen-
tation of new policies of enlightened university administrators. To be hired onto
the faculty requires, in all but the most exceptional instances, a Ph.D. degree, evi-
dence of research potential and an interest in teaching. Traditionally (the past 50
years) hiring, like curriculum planning, has been the business of departments with
slots distributed over the different divisions within the department. This may be
changing with changes in the way funding of research is managed and controlled.
Central administration is gaining more control as the federal government increases
funding of research centers which focus on “hot” topics deemed important to the
security and welfare of the nation. These research questions are generally interdis-
ciplinary in nature and so require the integration of the efforts of faculty from dis-
tinctly different disciplines and departments. As provosts and presidents have
worked to meet this demand, they have in the process gained more of a say about
the appointment of faculty.1
The best and most of the faculty openings are “tenure track” positions. A
freshly minted Ph.D. fortunate enough to obtain such a position will immediately
become an Assistant Professor. Generally he or she has seven or eight years to
prove worthy of tenure - which still means job security for life. Research produc-
tion remains the most important criterion in this respect. Promotion to Associate
Professor follows, although some departments will allow promotion to this rank
before a tenure decision need be made. Tenured, Associate Professors generally
can look forward to becoming Professors as long as they continue to produce qual-
ity research, serve the profession and the institution in expected ways, and teach
when called upon. 
The specific subject matter of research will depend upon the focus of the fac-
ulty member’s department, division, or research center as well as upon the individ-
ual’s field of expertise. But even within a specific domain, e.g., engineering
mechanics, research takes different forms. Some individuals will appear to behave
as the most theoretical of scientists, seeking a better understanding of particular
phenomenon relevant to their domain; e.g., those that develop mathematical/theo-
retical explanations of crack propagation in structural materials. Others will do
laboratory experiments to verify new theory so constructed. Laboratory testing of
a phenomenological conjecture - e.g., to test the efficacy of surface reinforcement
of concrete beams - is another respected type of research. 
Others will rely heavily upon mathematics but their interest will be in the
development of efficient methods for the evaluation of the consequences of theory
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of finite element methods for the calculation of the stresses and deflections of par-
ticular structures engaged an international research community of faculty over the
past half century. 
Still others do research on “systems” rather than particular physical phenome-
non. Faculty in mechanical engineering do research on manufacturing systems, in
aerospace engineering, on air traffic control systems, in chemical engineering, on
processing systems; in civil engineering on construction systems, water resources,
and environmental systems. Research on methods for multi-objective optimization
of systems would fit in this category. 
Finally there are those who must contend with social and political features of
systems in more explicit ways, e.g, in research programs on technology and policy.
Interdisciplinary research projects, in bioengineering, have a still different, mixed
form. 
The ideology of engineering research is the ideology of the science laboratory.
This is not to claim that the stuff, the content engineers confront in “the lab” is
very much like the content of the scientists’ explorations. Indeed, there may not be
any stuff at all, or what is seen and manipulated has but a virtual presence. Rather,
I mean the nature of the intellectual enterprise is the same: Boundaries around the
research task or program are drawn close in, as in physics, chemistry, mathematics.
The “all other things “of the ceteris paribus clause make up a very large set. A
piece of the world is defined, reduced down out of the big world, so that questions
relevant to the field can be well posed and quantitative results obtained in
response. The world of the engineering research task is an object world par excel-
lence, even more narrow and limited than the corresponding disciplinary matrix
essential to the work of the engineer out in the world, participating in the design
and development of a new product. 
I speak of engineering research though my topic is engineering undergraduate
education because I want to explore the fundamental beliefs and values teachers of
engineering bring into the classroom and how these influence educational reform.
The way we see things as teachers - the world, our students, our course content,
concepts, principles and worthy methods - depends upon the way we see and carry
out our research. Our ideas about what constitutes an important and well posed
research question, what ways of thinking are rational, what methods are appropri-
ately applied, and what will constitute a significant result – all of this guides and
constrains our educational efforts, sets our objectives, fixes course content, defines
our relationship with students and how we measure their progress. My claim is that
the scientific and instrumental essence and ethos of research fixes and limits the
way we see and attempt to reconstruct undergraduate engineering education. 
Research ideals and norms undergird the following propositions which, I
claimed at one time, set the framework for engineering faculty thinking about
engineering education2: 
• Mathematics and science are primary. Instrumental methods, and the 
reductionist perspective at their core, are essential to professional prac-
tice.
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unique solutions found using the instrumental methods learned in school.
• Knowledge is like a material substance. It can be segregated into inde-
pendent blocks. Curriculum design is a matter of choosing the right 
blocks and arranging them in the right sequence.
• Engineering faculty are the authoritarian sources and dispensers of all 
knowledge; we transfer the blocks to our note-taking, receptive students.
• Our graduates will enter engineering practice; there they will be 
rewarded for their effectiveness and creativity in applying their blocks of 
knowledge as individuals, working alone.
• What we teach is value free, context independent, and universally appli-
cable.
Over the past few decades, changes have been made in engineering programs
which indicate that these propositions are no longer taken as definitive. Change
has been motivated in part by evolving images of what faculty see their students
doing when they enter the profession. 
When I put forward the postulates above, I wrote also of two images of the
practicing engineer – one traditional, the other more modern. I did this because I
wanted to include in my analysis of curriculum reform the “needs of industry” as
well as research ideals and norms because faculty do speak of the former as well as
the latter when discussing curriculum reform. These two representations are to be
taken as ideal types, as strawmen if you like, or stereotypes, of our typical gradu-
ate at work; they are two different visions we, as engineering faculty, carry around
with us and reference at curriculum discussions, committee meetings and the like.
I labeled the traditional type the ideal of the 50’s. Another is less clear but form-
ing; I labeled it the ideal type of the 90’s. 
The 50’s type is well prepared in the sciences3. He applies this knowledge to
complex, high-tech problems of the kind encountered in the engineering of com-
plex military-industrial and aerospace systems. He does this as a staff employee
within a large, well equipped, well organized and authoritarian organization; he
toils within a bureau defined by its technical focus and expertise.
His company allocates a significant portion of its budget to research; a strong
research base is essential to its development of sophisticated “closed systems” -
products and systems designed for the benefit of all mankind, many for the secu-
rity of the nation. After a few years our 50’s type may return to the university to
enhance his research skills perhaps to pursue a Ph.D. then either re-enter the
industrial or government laboratory or join the faculty of some ever-expanding
engineering school. While those who choose to remain in industry will eventually
take on managerial responsibilities – as much as they disavow interest in this
aspect of the business – there remains the possibility of dual career ladders to
ensure that technical expertise receives its just rewards.
The ideal type of the 90’s is of a different sort. She is also well prepared in the
fundamentals, but now of a more diverse set of disciplines. Prepared too to work in
teams; able to articulate, communicate, and defend a proposal. The 90’s type is
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ied and multifaceted - negotiating a product specification with marketing on Mon-
day, the next day finding time to take some product reliability data down in the
lab. She seems never to have enough time to meet the demands of the three
projects which require her talents. Her firm, the firm of the 90’s type, is of smaller
scale -profit driven, thriving, or trying to survive, apart from large government
contracts. Its products are information technology-intensive yet designed for the
general public. Product design and development is now a favored activity; entre-
preneurial activity likely.4 When the 90’s type returns from this hectic world to the
university, she is as likely to take up a program in business, or in technology and
policy, as much as in engineering. Law school is a possibility as well. 
If we see our graduates as 50’s-type, then there remains no dissonance between
the aims of research and the aims of education. If, on the other hand, we picture
them as 90’s-type, then we have a disjunction between the aims and ideology of
research and of education. My claim is that we are moving from the old to the new,
for there is strong evidence that faculty and schools and colleges of engineering
are energetically developing new ways of thinking about what we want our stu-
dents to understand and be able to do - if our program of study is to be effective
and meet the needs of the times – as well as developing new content and means for
its teaching. I turn to review some of this activity.
Reform
 One need only turn to the journals of engineering education first to note their
increasing number, then the range and tenor of the articles, to see the growth in
interest in the reform of undergraduate engineering education over the past decade
on the part of faculty. The National Science Foundation has funded programs
aimed at reform at levels hitherto unseen; and ABET, the agency responsible for
setting accreditation criteria, has recently revised its recommendations for under-
graduate engineering degree program content and implemented a whole new sys-
tem for evaluation of the same. 
Professor Richard Felder et. al. have summarized the Accreditation Board for
Engineering and Technology’s new requirements:
...we must strengthen our coverage of fundamentals; teach more about 
“real-world” engineering design and operations, including quality man-
agement; cover more material in frontier areas of engineering; offer 
more and better instruction in both oral and written communication 
skills and teamwork skills; provide training in critical and creative 
thinking skills and problem-solving methods; produce graduates who 
are conversant with engineering ethics and the connections between 
technology and society; and reduce the number of hours in the engi-
neering curriculum so that the average student can complete it in four 
years.
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...even if nothing new is added to the existing curriculum, confining it 
to four years will be almost impossible unless more efficient and effec-
tive ways to cover the material can be found5.
This daunting challenge has not been shrugged off. Faculty and departments,
Deans and whole institutions have invested heavily in reform. Surveying the dif-
ferent school and university programs, we see a variety of proposed and actual ren-
ovation but, at the same time, only a handful of primary themes. 
One common recommendation is to shift from passive to active learning. Felder
et. al. again:
In the traditional approach to higher education, the professor dispenses 
wisdom in the classroom and the students passively absorb it. Research 
indicates that this mode of instruction can be effective for presenting 
large bodies of factual information that can be memorized and recalled 
in the short term. If the objective is to facilitate long-term retention of 
information, however, or to help the students develop or improve their 
problem-solving or thinking skills or to stimulate their interest in a 
subject and motivate them to take a deeper approach to studying it, 
instruction that involves students actively has consistently been found 
more effective than straight lecturing... 
...the challenge is to involve most or all of the students in productive 
activities without sacrificing important course content or losing control 
of the class6.
As an example of the shift from passive to active learning, some engineering
programs have taken the “introduction to engineering” course taught early on in
the student’s career, dropped the lecture format, and actively engaged students in
design projects over the semester. While requiring no sacrifice of important course
content, this innovation has none the less met resistance as it calls into question
the traditional notion that students can’t design until they have studied and mas-
tered the content of the different disciplines - the really important fundamentals -
which must be called upon in the creative synthesis of new products and systems.
In Mechanical Engineering, for example, the claim is made that one must study
structural mechanics, fluid dynamics, controls and thermodynamics before one can
do serious design work, of say an automobile. This is why the study of design tra-
ditionally has been left to the senior year, to a “capstone” design course. But now
many schools and colleges of engineering require first year students to do design.
These are not “drawing” courses but meant to teach some of the engineering fun-
damentals within the context of a design task - e.g., design a playground ride, a
windmill, rope bridge, and the like. The notion that science and theory go first is
being subtly challenged. The new idea is that one can go directly to more phenom-
enological understandings and do real engineering work in any field. 
Other reform goes under the banner of “hands-on”. Here there is explicit recog-
nition that science learning alone does not suffice to survive, none the less excel,
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the re-introduction of laboratory work, machining and hardware manipulation
skills, design-and-build projects, prototyping and testing – but it’s a different kind
of basics than Newton’s laws or the mean-value theorem. Product dissection,
where the students take apart a mechanical contrivance and attempt to figure out
why it has the properties it has, is one way of engaging students in the discovery of
engineering principles and appreciation of technique and craft. 
The emphasis on active learning is also what justifies proposals for ‘problem
based learning’ and the integration of open-ended, design type exercises through-
out the curriculum, not just in the first or the final year. Some faculty, including
your author, have promoted the introduction of such open-ended exercise into all
courses - engineering science subjects, laboratory courses as well as design
courses – at all levels. “Open ended” means that there is more than one answer to a
problem, more that one method to apply in getting an answer in many cases, and
that the student must participate in formulating the problem in the first place. The
aim is not to teach design per se but rather to redirect learning toward certain fea-
tures of engineering professional thought ordinarily discounted, if not simply
ignored, in the traditional curriculum and which are essential to critical, reflective
practice. 
Probably the least successful attempts at reform have been those which have
attempted to capitalize on the ever-increasing power and sophistication of com-
puter and information processing technique but have failed to take full advantage
of the technology. If one tries to incorporate the new with the old without changing
the old - that is, without considering changing the course content and what we
think is fundamental that the student learn - the results are bound to fall short of
expectations. If our assignments remain limited to well-posed problems with
unique solutions, then the use of a computer is hardly justified.
The failure of the technology to live up to its promise may also, paradoxically,
be blamed on the innovation itself, i.e., on the rate at which the technology is
improving each year. Faculty generally do not change the resources they use in a
course over a four or five year period. The syllabus, a favored textbook, a library
of problems and exercises, are relatively stable resources. In the same period of
time, changes in IT capabilities have been, and look to continue to be, dramatic.
Given this, faculty are not likely to invest time and energy, none the less funds, in
adopting and adapting computer technique and technology if it will have to be
redone again in the next year or two. Still, each year sees further incorporation of
the technology in the lives of students and faculty, e.g., in outside-the-classroom,
ad-hoc use as well as in applications in conjunction with substantial renovations in
course content and purpose, e.g., the infusion of open-ended exercises throughout
the curriculum. 
The above observations applies to traditional courses. There is one additional
very important way in which IT is changing the landscape: The technology itself
has become a thematic line in curriculum reform. That is, computer and informa-
tion technology is seen to so dominate the development of new products and sys-
tems – whether pharmaceuticals and their processing, air-transportation
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“smart” civil engineering structures which respond to the environment or call
home when something goes awry – that major shifts are in the making within engi-
neering departments to engage the challenges of designing and building these sys-
tems. We see the introduction of new courses and even “tracks” within the
departmental major focused on information systems. Within these new programs
there is a double opportunity for change. The fundamentals and what’s to be stud-
ied are in construction and this, together with the newness of the technology itself,
presents a relatively unconstrained field for trying out new ways of teaching and
for fostering new ways of learning. Time will tell how this challenge is met.
The essential ingredient in all of the more successful attempts at reform is a
move toward active learning and a refocusing on the student experience. We see a
shift from the didactics of single answer problems, which traditionally has been
the steady diet of most engineering courses and “canned” laboratory exercises to
open-ended tasks. Knowledge becomes, not a packaged commodity, but an event. 
Critique
While the reform of undergraduate engineering education is serious and better
funded than perhaps at any time in its history, there are certain features of the
effort which call for critique. Yes, we faculty recognize the virtues of actively
engaging the student in the classroom; no longer limit our deliberations to ques-
tions about what topics and methods to include in our syllabus; now experiment
with innovations in the classroom that appear to shift the focus onto the student
and their experiences in learning; and even take assessment – of our innovations,
of our teaching, as well as of our students – more seriously. Still, our discourse is
constrained. When we look at the challenge of reform, we see it through the tinted
glasses of instrumental, scientific analysis. This, as I hope to demonstrate, as
already evident in Felder’s laying out of the challenge of reform, seriously limits
possibilities for renewal.
Take, for example, the proposal Felder advances for how we should set instruc-
tional objectives and test to see if our students measure up: 
The behavior specified in an instructional objective must be directly 
observable by the instructor and should be as specific and unambiguous 
as possible. For this reason, verbs like know, learn, understand, and 
appreciate are unacceptable.7
What students should be able to do is: define, calculate, estimate, outline, list,
identify, explain, predict, model, derive, compare and contrast, design, create,
select, optimize - which presumably are “directly observable”. While he allows
that bringing our students to know, learn, understand, and appreciate “... are criti-
cally important goals,... they are not directly observable”. What’s implied is that
testing whether students can define, calculate...etc.will provide an indirect mea-
sure of whether or not one is meeting these other, what many faculty would call
softer8, educational objectives. 
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object; a creature fed with instructional materials and which, upon prompting with
the right sort of query, outputs a response which we directly observe and measure.
In the light of this recommendation, the meaning of the call to shift our focus from
teaching to student learning becomes ambiguous and problematic. 
This same instrumental perspective is reflected in the metaphors we use when
explaining what we are about. I have already described the “knowledge as stuff”
metaphor with its implication that more is better. It is there again in Felder’s eval-
uation of the challenge set by ABET when he notes the impossibility of fitting
everything, old and new, into a curriculum of but four years duration. It is
reflected too in the way faculty propose to include new content – e.g., ethics, com-
munications skills – by adding entirely new courses.
The closely allied metaphor of “mind as computer” is evident in the behavior-
ist’s imagery of Felder. More explicitly he writes:
Our goal in teaching is to get information and skills encoded in our stu-
dents’ long-term memories.9
Another common metaphor used in talk about course requirements and degree
programs is what I call the “production metaphor”: Here faculty picture their stu-
dents as “products for industry”. Their vision is of a mass production process; their
job to take hold of students when they enter the department, then process these
crude, raw materials and shape and polish them as they move along, lock step,
through the curriculum. In the end, if not rejected, they expect their students will
be fully functional and fit to meet “the needs of industry”. 
This same metaphor is evident in the proposals made by faculty who advocate
curriculum reform based upon “just in time” learning. Usually this method is
invoked in the context of project based, case study or design task learning. The
idea is that we expose and teach the student only those materials and at a level
which is appropriate to addressing the immediate exercise. Faculty bring the
knowledge components and resources into play at the time when they are needed,
delivering what is required to solve the immediate problem and no more. 
To its credit, the method emphasizes the importance of synthesis relative to
analysis and, as such, can indeed promote active learning. All of this is well and
good - in Felder’s terms, efficient and effective. The problem is that this way of
speaking and thinking about the students has consequences that are not so healthy.
For example: Objective testing, under the production metaphor, quite naturally
leads to measuring a student’s achievement by their location in a bell-shaped fre-
quency distribution. Faculty talk about student quality and worry about whether
their educational standards are too loose or too tight. Some departments, in accord
with the dictates of statistical quality control, may even require that a certain per-
centage of students, e.g., those lying at the left hand tail of the distribution, should
fail. This is not to say that representation of students’ learning in this aggregate
way is not useful and informative. But does it inform us about student achievement
or is it a test of our effectiveness as teacher? Perhaps we should inspect the
machinery of production.
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artifact, as computer, as product, as bucket, as container to be filled or charged,
loaded with the stuff of knowledge, and implanted with appropriate skills. It is a
way of seeing consistent with the kinds of representations engineers construct as
researchers in their modeling of systems with users as ergonomic appendages or as
aggregate consumers with certain limited preferences. If we insist on keeping our
tinted glasses on, it is very difficult to even conceive of how it might be different.
If we don’t take them off, it will be impossible indeed to meet the challenge ABET
has set. There just isn’t enough time or space in the four years to “cover” all that
needs to be covered.   
An alternate way of seeing
Israel Sheffler, in a collection of essays in the philosophy of education, in a
chapter on teaching basic mathematical skills, sees this world differently. He
claims that it is not sufficient to take the concept of knowing as the acquisition of
the distinctive principles and methods of a subject as the sole basis for setting
instructional objectives and curriculum requirements:
The aims of education must encompass also the formation of habits of 
judgment and the development of character, the elevation of standards, 
the facilitation of understanding, the development of taste and discrim-
ination, the stimulation of curiosity and wonder, the fostering of style 
and a sense of beauty, the growth of a thirst for new ideas and visions 
of the yet unknown.10
...successful performance in mathematics rests not only on general 
skills but also on general attitudes and traits such as perseverance, self-
confidence, willingness to try out a hunch, appreciation for exactness, 
and still others.11
And in another chapter in which he analyzes and exposes the shortcomings of
the computer-metaphor in speaking of mind, he lays out, contra Felder, why the
“...concept of information is far from capable of adequately expressing our educa-
tional aims.”
Even the capacity for intelligent use of information will not suffice to 
express our educational aims relative to problem-solving...
Problem-solving, further, needs not just the recognition and retention 
of facts but the recognition and retention of difficulties, incongruities, 
and anomalies. It does not simply affirm truths but entertains supposi-
tions, rejects the accepted, conceives the possible, elaborates the 
doubtful or false, questions the familiar, guesses at the imaginable, 
improvises the unheard-of. An intelligence capable only of storing and 
applying truths would be profoundly incapacitated for the solving of 
problems.12
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to see how it might have relevance to engineering education. Rubbing our eyes, we
explore and try to envision how it might prove enlightening.
We don’t have to buy the whole package. We can leave the development of
character and the elevation of standards to the side for the moment. On the other
hand, this talk about curiosity and wonder, new ideas, the yet unknown, and
unheard-of sounds much like the kind of talk we would engage if our topic were
how to foster creativity and innovation. And we have already reported on how
practicing engineers spend a good bit of their time and energy in striving to
explain why their productions malfunction. Problem solving in this mode indeed
requires the identification of difficulties, incongruities and anomalies, the enter-
taining of suppositions, the conception of the possible, etc. More problematic, per-
haps, is the idea that we elaborate the false or even reject the accepted.
But let us accept Scheffler’s broad sweep of the ingredients as pertinent to the
education of engineers; let us acknowledge that we seek to do more than convey to
our students information about concepts and principles, laws and properties, and
algorithmic methods for solving problems. Indeed, we may already claim that we
do attend to these, at least implicitly in our lectures and exchanges with the stu-
dent. How might we proceed?
The first step is to explicitly recognize that process is as important as product;
that means are as important as ends; that the ways the exercise is set, the ways the
students muddle through, are as important to address as are the answers they sub-
mit. We broaden the scope of “fundamentals” to include the recognition of diffi-
culties, incongruities, and anomalies; the entertainment of off-the-wall (perhaps)
suppositons; allow questioning the familiar, encourage improvisation et al. 
The next step is to imagine how we might actually do this, that is, construct
topics and exercises which would serve as the medium for teaching/learning the
fundamentals, now encompassing more than those at the focal point of the tradi-
tional content of our course. In an engineering mechanics course, the fundamental
concepts and principles which describe and explain the behavior of structures and
machines remain very much at center stage; Force and displacement, equilibrium
and continuity, friction, elasticity, plasticity, momentum and energy, statics and
dynamics remains the proper language to learn. The aim is not to displace the tra-
ditional but rather to enrich the context of their learning.
I consider three approaches; the first makes use of history; the second relies
upon student misconceptions; the third, open-ended, design type exercises of the
sort already described.
Using History.
History, the history of science and technique, is full of incongruities, supposi-
tions, rejection of the accepted, guesses at the imaginable and improvisation. The
serious study of history can be revealing and a contribution to knowing, even when
our predecessor was in error. Take, for example, Galileo’s faulty analysis of the
beam as a lever. In our commentary we described how, though his result was in
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otal intellect in the rebirth of science, a giant upon whose shoulders we stand. And
it was as much a technical event as it was scientific. 
He shows us about the relation of abstract model to concrete artifact; he relates
cause to effect in an analytical narrative; he explains the purpose of his analysis,
how it can be used to predict when a cantilever beam will fail; he reveals the
power of abstract representation, of underlying form, in describing how a whole
class of structures will behave; he attends to scaling up and scaling down in that
his analysis applies to the bones of giants as well as needles.
That he was in error can prompt other questions relevant to our new range of
fundamentals. We can “correct” his vision; we can draw an abstract lever, like the
one I overlaid on his figure, only this time remove the fulcrum and make it a true
isolated body to which we apply Newton’s laws. We can then engage our students
in conjecturing and with suppositions of a different sort: i.e., why did Galileo go
wrong? Why didn’t he recognize that equilibrium of forces was not satisfied? This
line of questioning can serve as a powerful vehicle for bringing students to speak
the language of “free-body diagram”, of the fundamental importance of a proper
isolation in the application of Newton’s Laws. At the same time it can be a confi-
dence builder - to recognize that Galileo had the same difficulties as they do in
constructing an idealization given the “real” beam. 
This last remark points to still another line of questioning: What does it mean
to say he was in error? Indeed, how justified are we in projecting back onto the
first few decades of the seventeenth century, our ways of seeing, of speaking, of
representing, of analysis? Here now is a whole other kettle of fish. At this point, if
we find ourselves so engaged and the student expresses interest in how historians
meet this challenge, it is perhaps best to recommend he enroll in a course in the
history of science. But note that the task of diagnosing error is akin in many
respects to the task we face in explaining the failure of modern technology - a task
that requires a social consensus - in the case of Galileo, of historians of science.
Navier’s modeling of an elastic solid as a collection of molecules which inter-
act, exerting sensible forces at insensible distances, can also be usefully treated in
a mechanics course. Here the question of the relation of the abstract to the concrete
looms large. This is as much a philosophical question as it is historical. But the
history makes the question real: The world of inter particulate forces is a possible
world which was indeed a world inhabited by mechanicians of the nineteenth cen-
tury. We can there engage in an exploration of the ontology of models: How “real”
are they? Is the claim that the solid behaves “as if” it were made of molecules so
acting but not that this is a true picture of the material at some atomic level? At
another level, the question is pragmatic and relevant to the challenges engineers
face in today’s world: How crude, how sophisticated a model do I need? In what
ways might my representation be deficient? 
Navier’s model is a more natural representation of a solid, elastic body than
that which speaks of stress and strain at any point in a continuum, as Cauchy soon
enough did. That is, it follows naturally from Newtonian ideas about the behavior
of isolated particles subject to external forces. Our textbook authors followed this
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Navier’s way of seeing before Cauchy’s construction then provides a more gentle
sloping path up to the concepts of stress, strain et al. (Do students repeat the mis-
takes of the past?)
The Wright brothers, in their testing of different airfoil shapes is another histor-
ical resource: The development of the balance could serve as an excellent example
of the power of abstraction in the analysis of the static equilibrium of rigid bodies
as well as an introduction to the concepts of lift and drag. Students would be chal-
lenged to construct the appropriate idealizations of all the members, introducing a
complete and consistent set of internal force components, then deduce a set of rela-
tionships which ensure that the requirements for static equilibrium are met for each
isolated member. They could critique the Wright’s method of analysis as reported
in their letters to Chanute, conjecturing the missing steps, imagining what
resources, both intellectual and material, they had to draw upon. They might be
challenged to actually replicate the apparatus and the tests the Wrights themselves
carried through. 
There is much here that faculty would agree is valuable for our students to
learn, to experience, using history. But there are also problems with this approach,
some of which we have already alluded to. For instance, to deal with history in
anyway other than superficially requires reaching beyond the myths and digging
into source materials first hand. While there are some secondary sources that will
serve in most domains of the sciences relevant to engineering, these generally are
not written for a student. That the history of science is not always what it has been
made out to be is evident in perusing the Structures of Scientific Revolutions:
Kuhn’s famous treatise can be read as a strident critique of the disregard and dis-
tortion of history on the part of teachers of science - at all levels. One of the norms
of the profession appears to be to disregard the past, to continually repaint the pic-
ture of the achievements of the past in accord with how we see the world today.
Another well known historian of science has gone so far to suggest that engaging
physics majors in serious study of the history of their chosen field might be dys-
functional.13 To assure that using history will not become abusing history will
require faculty preparation of a different kind. 
A more subtle danger: In any honest enquiry into the work of a Galileo, a
Navier, the Wrights or even a Laplace or a Newton we might wonder if these per-
sons were deficient in some way; was their mental machinery defective? Or does
the dissonance between the old and the new have more to do with our inability to
see that what we claim as facts, true concepts and principles, may be historically
contingent and contextually dependent? This is a whole other Pandora’s box
actively engaging scholars in the study of science, technology and society. If his-
tory is to be used, we must attend to this dimension; otherwise we shortchange our
students in shielding them from the importance of social context in the develop-
ment of science and technology. 
When to cut off the discussion, how much time to spend on a particular histori-
cal episode, is another question that has to be faced. For that matter, where in the
syllabus will we find the time to do all of this? And remember Felder’s concern: to
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where the probing of the historical sources might lead? What if the student really
develops an interest in the challenge of doing history, or won’t drop the discussion
until he has figured out how the Wrights actually thought through their design of
the balance? 
We must resist these thoughts; we must leave our tinted glasses on the table.
We must free ourselves from the image of a course as containing quantities of
knowledge which we must deliver to our students. Focus on “attitude” and “per-
spective” rather than what content to cover. And as for loss of control, control over
what? Is it over the amount of material we want to cover? Or is it more the fear
that the student will ask a question to which one does not have a ready answer? Or
that another student might chime in with a better one than the one you hastily con-
structed? If the latter, this itself can be an effective educational strategy, i.e., to
allow students to join in the development of ideas in a more free exchange than is
possible within the one-way dialogue of the traditional classroom - a more honest
Socratic technique.
Using students’ misconceptions.
In using history, we study ideas in a world of the past, of past institutions and
infrastructure, of peoples and apparatus long since gone, the evidence for which
survives only in texts and an occasional artifact. There we find incongruities,
anomalies, concepts we might never imagine, often error and even the still un-
heard of. But we don’t have to reach back to the past to encounter these phenom-
ena in rational scientific thought; we need only listen carefully to our students.
The notion here is that we can bring those new to our field to learn from reflec-
tion upon their erroneous ways of thinking about the world. These ways of think-
ing are often labeled misconceptions; they are to be treated, not as something to be
washed away or repressed without notice but as stories, like histories, to be ana-
lyzed in hopes that we can decipher and discover why anyone should hold to fal-
sity. If successful in this, we can rectify our student’s ways. 
I want to speak more about these supposed
cognitive malfunctions for I find in this topic, as
in history, a way to provoke new thinking of what
it means to know, to understand, to learn in engi-
neering as well as in science - a way to again
address our renewed fundamentals for problem
solving. I use as a vehicle for this exploration an
exercise found in a physics textbook and conjecture how a student might approach,
reason, imagine and finally be freed of his misconception. 
Explain why you can’t remove the filter paper from the funnel (shown 
in the figure) by blowing into the narrow end.14
Let’s assume our student thinks that one can indeed blow the filter paper out of
the funnel. What is he thinking? 
Learning Engineering   91He might be thinking about the details of the picture, wondering about the gap
between the filter and the funnel. Or is that the thickness of the glass funnel? He
may reflect back on the last time he made coffee, trying to remember if the filter
came to a point as shown. Why won’t the filter rest on the bottom of the funnel?
Maybe it will slide out. Should he worry about the friction between the filter and
the funnel at the line of contact? He worries about picking up the funnel and hold-
ing it horizontal so that the filter does not fall out without blowing at all. Maybe
you’re supposed to hold it vertical? Could the filter paper be wet, sticking to the
funnel, preventing its removal by blowing? Does the weight and thickness of the
filter paper matter? Its porosity?
Say now we give our student a clue: We suggest he go to his textbook and read
up on Bernoulli’s equation. He does so and comes to recognize that when he blows
down the tube that, although the air-stream will exert a pressure on the filter’s sur-
face between the filter and the inside surface of the funnel, the resultant of this
pressure –which would tend to push the filter to the right, out of the funnel – may
be less than the pressure exerted by the atmosphere on the inside surface of the fil-
ter, the resultant of which would tend to push the filter back into the funnel. So
maybe you can’t blow the filter out of the funnel after all.
At this point, we might say he has identified his misconception. But has he?
What was his misconception? That the filter was wet? That the funnel was made of
glass? That it was held vertically? That the porosity of the paper might matter? It
would be more accurate, more meaningful to say he had no conception of the phe-
nomenon at all rather than that he had misconceived its functioning. It’s the fog of
the unknown that he is struggling with, a rambling array of possible interpretations
of the text, including the figure, leading to nowhere in particular, not a misconcep-
tion. What’s wrong here is the reification of that which doesn’t exist. It is all of a
piece with the knowledge-as-stuff, the mind as a bucket image metaphor. In a less
strident tone, we might only advance a more literal rendering of his failing, e.g.,
that he missed the proper conception, allowing that he had no concept. But how far
did he miss it by? This again, is a queer way of speaking.
It is possible to identify a misconception if we work at it with him in a Socratic
exchange, leading him on to construct a faulty, common-sense explanation of the
phenomenon. But in this case, the misconception is as much our making as it is his.
Misconceptions are a dialogic construction, a social production. Discovering a
misconception is like constructing failure only in this case the system gone hay-
wire is the student and the process requires a dialogue between the teacher and the
errant student. Some speak of bringing the misconception to the surface so it can
be exposed and disposed of properly, to be replaced with the correct conception,
but this is, at least in this scenario, not the case. While this is a valid educational
strategy; it can be very effective in bringing the student to see the world of fluid
flow as the hydrodynamicist sees that world, it is a mistake to claim that the stu-
dent was possessed with a misconception. 
In our attempts to listen carefully and analyze the stories students tell, we need
to understand that the picture of the funnel and filter is not a picture of a real fun-
nel and filter but of one within a possible world of funnels and filters and stream-
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type within this world; a filter of zero, but impenetrable, thickness, of frictionless
surfaces and steady blowing. It looks like something real but it is not. Our stu-
dent’s failing is an inability to imagine, to think in this object world. Rather than
speak of a misconception its better to claim that he has not learned to see in this
way; he has not learned the language of hyrdrodynamics.
That language is about steady, incompressible fluid flow, of gauge- and abso-
lute pressures, of “head” and streamlines and mass flow. This is a world, a “game”
which particular persons inhabit and play. The game has rules, a proper language -
all that which constitutes a way of seeing, of thinking, and fixing legitimate
moves. When we ask our student to explain why he can’t blow the filter out of the
funnel we are asking him to join in and play the game without telling him the
rules. The language of hydrodynamics looks like English but it is not common
sense English. (Language here is more than words, it is culture, social norms, ways
of seeing the world). It’s no wonder he doesn’t think right. But once he claims to
know the language, then if he errs it is legitimate to use the label - “misconcep-
tion”. In this case, it might take very little prompting for the student to recognize
he was mistaken.
As in attempting to make use of history when our predecessors seemed to err,
so too in attempting to understand the foreign ways of thought and methods of our
students is problematic. The problem is in large part one of language; the students
must recognize they are learning a new one; we, at the same time, in our traditional
ways of developing theory, trying to make it accessible to our students, must be
sensitive to the disjunctions in meaning cited above.
Normally in our elaboration of hydrodynamic theory we derive a sequence of
mathematical relationships, proceeding from certain fundamental axioms, absent
any narrative about funnels, or filters altogether. Our statements would be descrip-
tive, not imperative. We would sketch a picture of a flowing fluid in a quite gen-
eral and arbitrary form, showing streamlines, but it would be minimalist,
consisting of a control volume much like the picture we have seen of a rigid body
showing five particles. We would introduce the pressure at the head of the flow
and downstream, velocity of flow at any point along a streamline. We would   stay
as close as possible to the analytical confines of the assumptions (incompressible,
steady), concepts (pressure, velocity) and principles (momentum, conservation of
mass) in unfolding the science. 
The problem is, that if this is to be more than an exercise in applied mathemat-
ics, we must make reference to the furniture of the big world of fluids and connect
it up with the formal analysis. In so doing, in talking about pipes and funnels,
water jets and reservoirs, it is impossible to remain uncontaminated by common
sense, by ordinary allusions expressed often, more problematically, in metaphori-
cal language. This is a necessity; the mathematical relationships to the neophyte
are just mathematical relationships which they might be very well prepared to
manipulate and re-arrange in accord with the world of mathematics but this does
not take us to where we want to go. We need the narrative of fluids, filters, and
atmospheric pressure to get there. The challenge is to bring the student to see as
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“objective” meaning. We ought not expect them to make the translation”, the read-
ing we do effortlessly within the special world of Bernoulli. The problem of lan-
guage is real. 
Spending time with students in this way presents other challenges. Let’s pre-
sume that our student doesn’t stop with recognition of the applicability of Ber-
noulli’s theory. Sensing he is on the right track, he seeks to apply Bernoulli’s
equation which relates the pressure to the velocity of flow along a stream line in an
airstream. He knows he has to show that the pressure exerted by the stream of air
flowing past the cone, between the cone and the filter outer surface, is everywhere
less than the pressure on the other side of the filter due to the atmosphere. 
But now he wonders: If there is a force to the left, why doesn’t the filter move
to close the gap until there is no gap, forcing the filter up firmly against the fun-
nel? Then in this case, there is no flow. But how can you not have flow and yet
have flow? Maybe the porosity of the filter paper does matter.
He muses further; perhaps one has to blow hard enough initially to move the
filter out enough so there is some flow so that the atmospheric pressure will push it
back. Or maybe this is why they show the gap between the filter and the funnel.
When you blow, the filter moves back against the funnel; then it moves out, to the
right again, so maybe the filter oscillates back and forth, fluttering in the air-
stream. 
Now he really is in trouble; he is speaking the right language but now he is
thinking too deeply; he has gone too far, introducing concepts which are beyond
the scope of the course. He has a conception of how things go and why one might
not be able to blow the filter out of the funnel. In fact, he might even have tried
blowing a filter out of the funnel and discovered that indeed, he hears a rattling
sound which he claims supports his conjecture. Unfortunately, the analysis of the
fluttering behavior of a filter in a funnel is an advanced topic, one that requires
more than hydrodynamic theory. Bernoulli’s equation does not contain sufficient
information to describe this dynamic, perhaps aeroelastic, phenomenon. 
Here, strangely enough, it is legitimate to say he has erred, and this in two
ways: In the first place, while he knows the rules of the game, he has not conceived
the abstract representation as it was meant to be seen. His image is too sophisti-
cated. Second, broadening the context of the exercise to include appropriate strate-
gies the student might take to succeed in the course, he has misjudged what is
required to earn the approval of faculty. Either way, matters in this case have
moved out of control: Faculty may wonder how they are going to make up for the
time lost in addressing the interesting provocations of certain students, yet sense
that to cut students off would let an opportunity for learning slide away. One sim-
ply has to draw the line somewhere, acknowledge the legitimacy of the student’s
thinking, questioning, and move on.
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While the study of history and student’s thinking in the raw can be splendid
vehicles for engaging our new fundamentals, they both fail to attend to a very
important feature of engineering thinking and doing; they fail to address the con-
text of contemporary practice. History has context, and that certainly must be
respected, but it is not contemporary. Dealing with misconceptions is dealing with
ideas, but ideas of a sole individual alone, irrespective of any particular context.
Introducing open-ended exercises can, on the other hand, bring context to the fore. 
If our new enriched set of fundamentals are taken seriously, it’s clear that there
has to be significant change in what goes on in the classroom both in our engage-
ment of students in the material of our course and throughout the whole curricu-
lum. This is not a question of changing the content to “cover” this new material or
adding more courses. It is a question about questions, about what are legitimate
questions, about attitudes toward content, about boundaries on our object-world
subject matter. 
I have already described how this might be accomplished. I have already
described innovations faculty have pursued in problem-based learning, in hands on
experiences, in the use of open-ended exercises. These can be the vehicles for the
infusion we seek. Take, for example, the use of open-ended, design-type exercises
in an engineering science course.
A truly open-ended task invites the student to deal with ambiguity and uncer-
tainty; to be aware of how different contexts may demand different strategies even
though the technical “problem” may appear the same. Students learn how to judge
what resources to bring to bear in different settings – know when a crude model
and estimate will suffice, when a detailed and sophisticated computer analysis is
required. Degree and form of justification becomes a matter of context. 
In an open-ended situation, if done right, students must appropriate the problem
on their own terms. No longer is the quest to produce the answer the faculty has in
his head or found in the back of the textbook. This is not to say that “anything
goes”: While the context allows that there may be more than a unique solution and
a single approach, some solutions will be better than others, some worse, some
outright wrong. Faculty provide guidance, leading students through what may
often appear as a very muddled situation. It is their responsibility to judge the
amount of effort the task will require and set expectations accordingly. They set
constraints, but not over constrain; provoke thought but not dictate a method;
respond to student questions but not with absolutist answers. Open-ended exer-
cises, if done right, serve as a powerful vehicle for active learning, for engaging
the student in a way not possible sticking to the traditional prescription of single
answer problems. If done right they allow the student to deal with anomalies, to
address incongruities, to conceive of all sorts of possibilities, to improvise the
unheard-of.
They learn also about an important ingredient of engineering thought not
touched upon by Scheffler, namely how to negotiate their differences when their
proposals differ from and/or conflict with those of a partner working on a common
project. They begin to see that designing is a social process.
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ences to allow and encourage critical discussion and reflection on the problem at
hand. This discussion can include normative issues as well as instrumental ques-
tions about technical concepts, principles and methods. In this way we can make
the shift from teaching to learning, from talking to listening, from derivation to
critical discussion and dialogue and do so throughout the hard core of the engi-
neering/science curriculum. 
As an example of the transformation that is
possible to effect, I present two exercises,
both of which I have used in an undergradu-
ate, introductory course in engineering
mechanics. One is a traditional, single-answer
problem. The other is an open-ended design
task.
The traditional exercise is meant to teach
the student the importance of the principles of
static equilibrium, compatibility of deforma-
tion and the role of material properties in the
analysis of the deflections of, and internal
forces within, an elastic system. These are the traditional fundamentals.
The problem is stated thus:
A wood diving board is hinged at one end and supported 1.5m from this 
end by a spring with a constant of 35 kN/m. How much will the spring 
deflect if a young man weighing 600 N stands at the end of the board?
There is but a single answer which, if the student is on top of the material of the
course, should take no more than a half hour at most to produce. This presumes he
is competent in the language of mechanics, i.e., recognizes the wiggly line as a lin-
ear elastic spring, understands that the circle at the right hand of the board is a fric-
tionless pin, knows enough to assume the board itself is rigid (to analyze the
situation if the board is not rigid comes later in the course) and is thoroughly at
home with the metric system.
The second exercise presents very much the same picture but otherwise is dra-
matically different. The assignment is as follows:
You are responsible for the design of a complete line of diving boards 
within a firm that markets and sells worldwide. Sketch a rudimentary 
design of a generic board. List performance criteria your product must 
satisfy. Include on your list those features which determine the perfor-
mance of the board. Focusing on the dynamic response of the system, 
explore how those features might be sized to give your design the right 
feel...
1.5 m  
1.35 m  
50 mm
Person of  600N
           Figure 5.1 A Traditional Exercise
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vided but are to be determined, or “sized”. The
written “problem” statement does not, can not,
stand alone. It is essential that students and fac-
ulty discuss (negotiate) the problem require-
ments and expectations. Now the student must
join in the formulation of the exercise, think
about “performance criteria” such as the weight
of the person using the product. Or is it per-
sons? If so, what range of weights ought to be
accommodated? 
The fundamental principles of mechanics are still very much at the center of the
task but the context is much richer. A discussion of “dynamic response” is neces-
sary. Here I have the students imagine they are at the end of a diving board, testing
its “bounce”. They estimate a frequency of bounce.   We talk about “equivalent
stiffness” - the relationship between the deflection at the tip of the board and the
weight of the person, about whether one can neglect the weight of the board or its
flexibility. What about safety?
The students keep a journal. Since there is no single, unique response, the
methods the student apply, the assumptions they make and their strategy for com-
paring different possible designs need to be evaluated. In this, faculty expectations
must accord with a reasonable estimate of time available for the students to “com-
plete” the exercise. I normally require that their journals be handed in within a
week’s time.
A warning: An open-ended exercise can be closed down if one puts the tinted
glasses back on, if one wavers in the light of the student’s aggressive questioning -
their taking control - or in the weight of the task of reading through their reports.
(The task admits of more than a single answer so evaluation must turn to focus on
process and methods). This must be resisted.
This single example, taken from but a single course, appears not to say much
about educational reform if our gaze remains fixed on content, what goes in the
syllabus, or what courses should constitute a curriculum. But if we look from
another perspective we might see that it addresses the fundamentals of engineering
and engineering education across the board, through and through, irrespective of
discipline and level - indeed, irrespective of content. That is the point. One can
imagine how the traditional content in any subject might be recast in another
mode, one that encourages the sort of open ended enquiry and sensitivity to con-
text advocated here.   
When we stop and think about it, those characteristics and aspects of learning
which Scheffler claims are necessary to problem-solving are just the ones we value
as researchers and in our engineering practice in the rough. We find, thus, we are
not in another world but a familiar one indeed. But it is one we have to see prop-
erly, from a perspective that rejects the instrumental ontology, one that sees the
fullness of all that constitutes engineering thought and practice.
     a
 
   Person 
       Figure 5.2 An Open-Ended Exercise
L
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6ExtrapolationWhile engineering and philosophy may be worlds apart, I hope the reader at this
point would agree that the questions philosophers address and the analyses they
pursue are relevant to engineering - that the ways in which engineers think through
their designs, deal with the malfunctioning of their productions, and teach the
young are better understood if we bring a philosophical perspective to bear. Onto-
logical questions about the existential qualities of the representations engineers
make and use in their work are important and need critique and evaluation if our
designing, our diagnosing, our teaching is to improve. Otherwise we risk presum-
ing too much of our productions, conferring on them a solidity and robustness
unwarranted in fact which eventually will lead to error. Epistemological questions
about the status of knowledge claims and the form and tenor of their justification
likewise are important to address for, without this sort of enquiry, we remained
boxed in, constrained and limited to see engineering solely as reductive technique,
materialist representation and manipulation. 
At the same time, in exploring this terrain we are led away from philosophy; we
discover that what engineers do, the reasons they do what they do, and their justifi-
cation for believing the latter are good and true - all of this is historically and cul-
turally contingent, not fixed by the dictates of science and empirical fact alone.
Out of this comes a picture of both the possibilities and limitations of engineering
thinking, what it can accomplish, what it cannot do - a picture with more depth and
color than that we draw when constrained to paint only in instrumental tones. 
Key to my analysis is the notion of “object-worlds” - the idea that different par-
ticipants in design see the object of design differently depending upon their com-
petencies, responsibilities and their technical interests. The ontological status of
the object then becomes problematic. It can mean, can be, different things to dif-
ferent people. The same object, say a prismatic bar, to the structural engineer is a
cantilever beam while to the person responsible for ensuring that the system does
not overheat, it is a radiating appendage. This multifaceted character of the object
of design - one object, multiple object-worlds - ensures that instrumental rational-
ity does not suffice in design, nor in diagnostics and ought not be the sole thrust of
engineering education. 
In the course of my essay, I have noted the ways we divide up the world when
we come to speak of technique. Within the design process we split up the design
task and establish interfaces, hoping to keep control of the project; linguistic and
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function, between the hard and the soft, between the sure and the uncertain,
between product and social context. Maintaining these disjunctions depends upon
seeing the artifacts of engineers - both ideas and objects - as hard, deterministic,
permanent, totally rule bound, and material. I have argued that this view is defi-
cient. These divisions are as much an artifact of culture as they are a consequence
of science and the material richness of our world. 
Take for example, the status of engineering theories, so critical to the justifica-
tion of designs, the explanation of failure as well as so central in engineering edu-
cation. These, expressed in mathematical form as in a textbook, appear formal,
wholly analytic, universal in their applicability, quantitative and as sure as the
numbers they produce - seemingly all on their own. They provide the structure -
what Pirsig called the underlying form - which ensures the proper functioning of
the products of engineering design. But their expression and manipulation-in-use
presents a more confused picture: They are more supple, more plastic than they
first appear. In designing and in diagnostic activities they are reconstructed, pared
and sculpted to the particular problem at hand. The legitimacy of such moves
depends upon what is acknowledged, perhaps only implicitly, as accepted, conven-
tional practice, which, in turn, is a social affair.
The distinction between structure and function of engineering productions is
likewise not as sharp as some would believe. In engineering, design, diagnostics
and in teaching - every statement of structure, of the properties of an object other
than those we can call familiar or vulgar, requires an extended story constructed in
accord with the prevailing perspective and the particular needs of the task at
hand1. This usually entails speaking about some aspect of the “performance” or
“behavior” of the object. 
A beam–for example, is more than a prismatic bar exhibiting certain dimen-
sions and made of a certain material. If these were the only properties the struc-
tural engineer had available to work with, we would have neither bridges nor
buildings. For this we need at least a modulus of elasticity and a number which
defines when the material will fail. These additional, specialized, object-world
properties, have meaning only when related to the performance of the object, i.e.,
its function as a beam. The modulus of elasticity requires talking about its linear,
elastic behavior - how it will deflect an amount proportional to the amount of
weight at the end; how it will return to its original configuration if the weight is
removed. 
To define when the beam will break, we refer to another feature of perfor-
mance. In Galileo’s story, he relates the weight at failure to that weight which
when suspended from the same beam hung vertically would cause failure. Today,
we define a property - the “yield stress” - whose numerical value we can look up in
a table. But, like Galileo’s measure, this value only has meaning as a consequence
of the engineering profession’s setting out of a standard test requiring special
machines, special instrumentation, and special conventions over the years. Object
world properties are socially contingent thus in two ways; in the ways they depend
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the conventions which define methods to ascertain the values of properties.
In the chapter on malfunction and diagnosing failure, I tested the notion that
engineers can claim certainty with respect to their designs. I concluded no: all
engineering products and systems remain under-determined. The boundary
between the sure and the unsure is never so clear that we can predict with certainty
how our productions will perform. We never can anticipate all contexts of use.
In the same vein, products, like information, can be read differently by differ-
ent persons and be put to use in different ways. An engineered artifact can function
in a variety of ways, some unthought-of by participants in the design process them-
selves. The variety of function is inherent in the indeterminacy and the underdeter-
mined nature of the design process. This, in turn, derives in large part from the
challenge of bringing the different visions of the design professed by different par-
ticipants into a coherent harmony. 
That a design remains under-determined also means that any claim of technical
perfection is unjustified. Within an object world, one may indeed be able to find an
optimum design with respect to some subset of properties and with respect to the
object’s performance appropriate within that world. We can claim that algorithmic
perfection is possible within an object world. In the design of the whole however,
now taking our context as that of the project or the firm, this is not possible. There
is no instrumental synthesis which can dictate perfection without negotiation of
participants proposals, claims and demands. Preferences, technical preferences, are
negotiated over object worlds. In the big world, however, attributing value or qual-
ity to a technical product is always a social process - reflected in my analysis of
the social construction of failure. The boundary between a “good” and a “bad” pro-
duction becomes diffuse. 
Accepting this more complex vision of engineering thought and practice sug-
gests an extrapolation is in order - one to tease out its implications for the way we
think about the role of technology in our lives. First off, it strikes me as unhealthy
to continue to refer to the “impacts” of technology on society as if technology was
one thing - hard, structuring, determined, sure - and society another - soft, func-
tioning, indeterminate, uncertain. Likewise to think that technology “has a life of
its own” may be in order within an object-world of replicating automaton, but it is
romantic nonsense to think and talk this way out here in the big world. So too to
imagine we can perfect a missile defense shield, that we can profit from the
genetic manipulation of life at all levels without occasioning significant collateral
damage, or that we can convince every scientist that global warming is upon us
before it is too late to do anything about it - all of this wishful thinking. It follows
from a seriously flawed vision of technology, one that sets it apart and aloof, dis-
tant and seemingly out of reach of ordinary people. As citizens, we ought to know
and do better. 
 
fin 
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